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Abstract
Political polarization is a defining feature of the contemporary American political
landscape. While there is little doubt that elite polarization levels have risen dramatically
in recent decades, there is some debate over the existence of a corresponding rise in mass
polarization. Recent scholarship on mass polarization has cited evidence related to
citizens’ positions on public policy issues, party sorting, and geographic polarization;
however, questions remain as to the nature and extent of mass polarization in online
spaces. Specifically, more needs to be known regarding how expressions of elite
polarization influence the formation of polarized communities within social media.
This dissertation examines the question: Does elite polarization contribute to mass
polarization in social media? This question is approached in three stages. First, this
dissertation tests whether or not a causal link between elite and mass polarization
strengthens with temporal proximity to highly politicized and potentially polarizing
events over the span of the 2016 Republican presidential primary. Second, this
dissertation examines the instant effects of elite polarization by examining a minute-byminute live stream of reactions on Twitter during the first 2016 presidential debate.
Third, this dissertation tests a contemporary theory which claims a presidential
candidate’s patterns of speech sows the seeds of mass polarization in the form of
resentment, fear, or incivility.
This dissertation also employs the use of network analysis tools to measure the extent to
which polarized communities form on social media in response to elite cues. The nature
of such causal relationships provides insight into the influence polarizing messages by
elites may have on mass polarization while taking into consideration the unique
characteristics of the social media communications environment. In doing so, this
dissertation offers a blueprint for future researchers who seek to better understand how
networked technologies shape human interactions.
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Trolling Twitter: Introduction
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“When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the system usually ends up in a
really good place.” – Mark Zuckerberg

“Social media … is a veritable battleground, where insults fly from the human quiver,
damaging lives, destroying self-esteem and a person's sense of self-worth.” – Anthony
Carmona

“I don’t know a twitter from a tweeter but I know it’s important.” – Hillary Clinton

“I love Twitter.... it's like owning your own newspaper--- without the losses.” – Donald
Trump

The 2016 presidential race was considered by many to be one of the most
divisive, uncivil, and polarizing political races in recent American history. According to
recent polling by Zogby Analytics, 68% of Americans viewed the contest between
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump as being “extremely or very uncivil” (PR Newswire,
2016). This represented a more than three-fold increase over Americans’ views
regarding the “extremely or very uncivil” nature of prior presidential contests between
Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in 2012 (20%), Barack Obama and John McCain in
2008 (18%), and George W. Bush and John Kerry in 2004 (15%). An open animosity
between candidates and their campaigns was evident on the campaign trail, in political
advertisements, during debates, and in television reporting. In turn, this behavior
produced a super-charged political environment ripe with examples of elite polarization.
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Such conditions provided an excellent opportunity to study what effects, if any, elite
polarization has on mass polarization.
The phenomenon of rising elite polarization has also been accompanied by a
concurrent rise in the use of social media as a vehicle for political communication. One
particularly popular social media platform for this type of communication has been
Twitter, which allows users to instantly share thoughts, opinions, and reactions via words,
images, and HTML links. One of the most valuable aspects of Twitter is that it provides
an immediate snapshot of a person’s state of mind; reactions to external stimuli can be
measured in near real-time. Just as the conditions of the 2016 presidential race provided
an excellent opportunity to study possible links between elite polarization and mass
polarization, the emergence of social media as a popular form of political discussion
provides an extremely valuable tool for measuring such possible links.
This dissertation examines the question: “Does elite polarization contribute to
mass polarization in social media?” Such a question is not only important for better
understanding the dynamics of political polarization, but it is especially timely given the
convergence of increases in political incivility and the rise of social media as a political
platform. The bulk of prior literature on political polarization has studied the
phenomenon through the lens of the traditional media environment, while using methods
appropriate for such settings. However, this dissertation argues that the social media
environment is vastly different than the traditional media environment, most notably with
respect to the structural dynamics of social media that redefine what it means to be a
political elite. As such, this dissertation utilizes a mixed methods approach including
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social network analysis and visualization in order to better understand how members of
social networks react to polarizing behavior on the part of elites.
One major benefit of studying social networks is that it allows researchers to
examine how interpersonal relationships and social neighborhoods form in response to
“real world” events. Prior research on causal links between elite and mass polarization
has primarily relied upon evidence citing individuals’ positions on public policy issues
and party sorting (Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Hetherington 2009; Levendusky 2009;
Abramowitz 2013). While these are definitely useful measures, any ostensible effects are
often separated from their purported causes by a considerable amount of time. This time
lag allows for a significant muddying of the waters, as individuals have increasingly more
opportunities to be influenced by multiple intervening variables as the time horizon
between cause and effect increases. Perhaps even more importantly, such measures of a
causal relationship largely rely upon self-reporting and proxies, which are prone to
subjectivity, reporting error, and imperfect comparisons.
I approach the main research question of this dissertation in three stages. First, I
use daily measurements to test whether there is a relationship between rates of affective
rhetoric and the temporal proximity to major political events over a one-year time span.
Second, I use minute-by-minute measurements to test for similar relationships over the
100-minute span of a presidential debate. Third, I test a contemporary theory which
claims a presidential candidate’s patterns of speech sows the seeds of mass polarization
in the form of resentment, fear, or incivility. In all three cases, I employ cutting-edge
network analysis and visualization tools to measure the extent to which any such rises in
affective rhetoric are successful in gaining influence in their respective networks.
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The following overview summarizes how the following chapters pursue the
question regarding the effects of elite polarization on mass polarization in social media:

Chapter Two: Theoretical Model and Literature Review
Communication technology made significant advancements during 1990’s, as the
Internet and the World Wide Web made it possible for people across the globe to access
news and information instantly, while also gaining the ability to share information with
others. The rapid advancement of social media technology during the first decade of the
21st Century made it possible for people to share information in ways that were
previously unimaginable. Further, these shifts allowed the common citizen to
communicate in ways that could potentially rival the influence and reach of traditional
mainstream media outlets.
These seismic shifts in communication technology represent a paradigmatic shift
which require a rethinking of traditional political communications theory – especially
with respect to the extent elite cues play in establishing possible causal links between
elite polarization and mass polarization. Further, more needs to be known regarding how
the social media environment modifies the impact and reach of affective rhetoric, as well
as how such language contributes to the formation of polarized communities. Chapter
Two presents a theoretical model for examining such causal links while, presents a
review of the relevant communications literature, and outlines the chronological
development of social network analysis as a methodological discipline.
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Chapter Three: Data and Methods
A primary goal of social network analysis is to better understand how members in
a network share information, gain influence, and create communities of discussion. As
Chapter Two argues, achieving this goal requires a rethinking of existing
communications theory and the use of a new set of methodological tools. However,
many of these tools employ concepts and analyses that are foreign to the traditional study
of political science. As such, Chapter Three provides an overview and explanation of the
specific methods used in this dissertation.

Chapter Four: Social Network Patterns of Affective Rhetoric during the 2016 Republican
Primaries
Chapter Four presents the first of three sequential empirical studies designed to
test the main research question of the dissertation. The first empirical chapter draws
upon an original data set of 366 daily observations collected over a one-year period
during the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary comprised of roughly 8.4 million tweets
containing approximately 160,000,000 words. This chapter uses a broad time frame for
examining whether political events cause an increase in mass affective rhetoric, while
also seeking evidence regarding the impact extreme affective rhetoric has on the
architectural structure of networks.

Chapter Five: The Instant Effects of Confrontation, Controversy, and Contempt: A livestream analysis of mass polarization on Twitter during the 2016 presidential debates
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Whereas Chapter Four examines the dissertation’s main research question from a
broad temporal perspective, Chapter Five examines the same question with a far higher
level of temporal detail. Drawing upon a second unique data set of approximately
1,500,000 tweets captured live and categorized into one-minute intervals during the first
2016 U.S. presidential debate, this chapter seeks to measure the immediate reactions by
individuals when they are exposed to potentially polarizing elite cues. Few studies have
sought to analyze causal relationships between elite cues and mass affective rhetoric with
the level of detail which is pursued in Chapter Five. The findings presented in this
chapter suggest compelling evidence that such reactions are often extreme and have an
immediate impact on the formation of polarized communities.

Chapter Six: Mountains or Molehills? Examining the “Trump Effect” on Twitter
The third and final empirical chapter applies the theory and methods developed in
this dissertation to test a prevailing argument forwarded by media and political elites
during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election: the existence of a “Trump Effect”.
Specifically, this argument posited that the language and actions of Donald Trump during
the presidential election caused feelings of fear and anxiety among several segments of
U.S. society, while simultaneously encouraging anger and aggression in others. The
possible existence of such an effect raised important questions regarding how presidential
candidates’ patterns of speech may influence feelings of resentment, fear, or incivility.
However, such a purported effect has not received a level of rigorous scientific inquiry
befitting of its ostensibly serious implications.
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Chapter Six seeks to help fill this void by analyzing the effects of Donald
Trump’s most controversial remarks during the U.S. presidential election on social
networks. This chapter draws upon an original data set of approximately 4,500,000
tweets consisting of nearly 86,000,000 words collected over the span of 548 consecutive
days from 9/1/2015 through 3/1/2017. Findings in this chapter suggest that while there
was evidence of a causal relationship between controversial remarks by Donald Trump
and a resulting rise in anxiety, fear, and aggression, similar effects were found when
examining remarks made by his opponent, Hillary Clinton.

Chapter Seven: Future Research, Implications, and Conclusions
The final chapter reviews the findings presented in this dissertation while
discussing how these findings better inform our understanding of the relationship
between elite and mass polarization, the implications for the study of political
communication in the social media era, and the ways in which future research can expand
and refine the findings presented in this dissertation. Further, I discuss the wider societal
implications of this dissertation with respect to prevailing utopian and dystopian
perspectives regarding social media and the Internet, while placing the research into
context with emerging networked technologies.
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Dissertation Chapter 2
Theoretical Model and Literature Review

Eric C. Vorst
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Introduction
In this dissertation, I expand upon existing theories regarding the relationship
between elite polarization and mass polarization in order to answer the question: Does
elite polarization contribute to mass polarization in social media? I propose that a
completely different approach is required when testing for potential causal relationships
in the social media environment than the approach used when testing for potential causal
relationships in the traditional media environment. Such a different approach is
necessary because of fundamental differences between the two communications
environments. These differences are discussed in greater detail within this chapter and
following chapters.
The hypotheses presented in the empirical chapters of this dissertation are based
upon the following theoretical model:

This theoretical model proposes that potentially polarizing cues originate from
elites and enter the communications environment. When the mass public is exposed to
these cues, there is a likelihood of increases in mass affective rhetoric which, in turn,
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could contribute to increases in affective polarization. Due to the unique nature of the
social media environment, the mass public is able to re-enter the communications
environment to express polarized cues of their own – not unlike the cues originating from
elites. In theory, this process reinforces an increasingly polarized communications
environment that creates spaces where mass political polarization can develop. In other
words, social media allows for affective rhetoric to not only spread efficiently among the
mass public, but to be amplified by members of the mass public as well. Further, it
allows for individual communities of ideological homogeneity to form with far greater
ease than was previously possible in the traditional media environment.
The vast majority of prior research on elite cues, political polarization, and media
effects have been conducted within the context of the traditional media environment. It is
critical to acknowledge the unique nature of the social media communications
environment, how it differs from the traditional communications environment, and why
this matters when testing this theoretical model. Given the completely different structure
of the social media communication environment, it is possible that the influence and
reach of elite cues disseminated through social media sources will be different than the
same elite cues would be in traditional media sources. As such, the existing literature is
in need of revisiting and, in some cases, revisions.
One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to illustrate how and why
traditional approaches to political communication analysis may not be the best fit for
studying political communication in social media. To build this case, I first draw upon
literature addressing three predominant forms of polarization: elite, mass, and affective,
while also discussing the role played by incivility. Second, I discuss elite cues, self
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selection, and how these variables react differently within the traditional and social media
communication environments. Last, I provide support for network analysis as a robust
means for testing these relationships by presenting a chronological overview of the
development of social network analysis as a reliable and effective methodology within
the social sciences.

Political Polarization
Elite Polarization and Mass Polarization
Political polarization is a defining feature of the contemporary American political
landscape. By most measures, polarization amongst political elites has reached record
levels (Heatherington 2009). A primary tool for measuring polarization among elites is
DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation), originally
developed by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal in the early 1980s. This tool utilizes
roll-call vote records by members of Congress as a means for estimating their position on
the liberal/conservative ideological continuum. After multiple iterations over multiple
congressional sessions, trends have emerged over time which demonstrate a clear
ideological divergence in voting behavior among political elites. In short, Republicans
are voting in a more exclusively conservative manner, Democrats are voting in a more
exclusively liberal manner. More importantly, there has been progressively less overlap
in the moderate areas of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats.
Recent research suggests polarization in Congress has become so pronounced that
congresspersons sharing district borders, yet representing different parties, consistently
vote in opposition to each other – even when congresspersons share heavily
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gerrymandered borders where one would expect some geographical common interests
(Andris 2015). These phenomena are indicative of the widening levels of polarization
amongst American leaders and are widely considered to influence our political system in
a way that causes more harm than good. For example, an increasingly polarized U.S.
Congress faces more scenarios where compromise is difficult to achieve, leading to
gridlock and – in some cases – threats of a government shut down (Farina 2015).
The extent to which polarization manifests itself in the American electorate is still
an open question. Fiorina has provided strong support for the argument that most voters
have not been influenced by increased levels of polarization amongst elites (2011). At
the same time, polarization can be observed through increased levels “sorting”, wherein
voters’ party identification and ideological self-placement are increasingly aligned
(Levendusky 2009). Polarization is also evidenced by a tendency of supporters of one
party to follow to demonize supporters of the opposing party (Abramowitz 2013).
Further, there is evidence to suggest mass polarization is fueled by deep-seated
psychological impulses of “fear and loathing” of members in the opposing political party,
especially amongst those who are in the “out party” (Kimball, et al. 2014).
Recent national polls support the conclusion that the American public is
increasingly divided along party lines and, more importantly, separated by an increasing
gap of partisan identification. The Pew Research Center (2014) found the percentage of
Democrats who were consistently more liberal than the median Republican rose from
70% to 94% from 1994 to 2014. Similarly, the percentage of Republicans who were
consistently more conservative than the median Democrat rose from 64% to 92%.
During the same time span, the levels of antipathy towards members of the other political
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party more than doubled, with the percentage of Democrats viewing Republicans very
unfavorably rising from 16% to 38% and the percentage of Republicans viewing
Democrats very unfavorably rising from 17% to 43%.
Just as levels of elite polarization can be measured by observing behavior on the
part of political elites such as voting records or other elite cues, levels of mass affective
polarization can be measured by observing variances in mass affective rhetoric.
Questions remain as to whether or not high levels of affective polarization translate into
high levels of mass political polarization. However, it is reasonable to believe that such a
relationship could exist, as an atmosphere filled with strong psychological divisions could
be primed for divisions along other lines, given the proper elite cues are delivered.
Such a possibility appears more likely when one considers the possibility that
expressions of political polarization in the form of elite cues may have a kind of framing
effect on the mass public, wherein expressions of political polarization by elites
influences and shapes the mass public’s understanding of political reality. Broadly
defined, political framing occurs when a story or issue is portrayed using a specific
perspective or through a particular lens. Despite being presented with the same set of
facts, a person may reach different conclusions depending upon the way an issue is
framed. Framing has the potential to be a powerful persuasive tool, as it occurs in a
manner that is far less obvious than the traditional means of outlining an argument based
upon clearly stated premises and conclusions.
If viewed from a framing theory perspective (Blumer 2015), the framing potential
of elite cues would equate to elites affecting not only polarized behavior on the part of the
mass public (or, “what to think about”) but also potentially affecting polarized political
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positions on the part of the mass public (or, “what to think about it”). Given the
influence of political figures’ ideological differences on affective mass polarization
(Rogowski and Sutherland 2015), such a causal link is not out of the question. In
attempting to answer questions regarding the extent and effects of mass polarization on
political participation, the vast majority of research has been conducted through the lens
of traditional forms of communication, such as mass media messages, candidates’
campaigning tactics, or voting behavior of elected officials.

Affective Rhetoric, Incivility, and Affective Polarization
An increasing body of literature has defined mass polarization in terms of affect.
While related to the concept of emotion, affect is best defined as emotion that persuades.
When applied to political polarization, this school of thought argues that rather than being
driven by political ideology, political divisions in the mass public are driven by hostility
towards the opposing party. Instead of a person with one party identification opposing
someone with a different party identification based upon ideological differences or policy
disagreements, such hostility is the product of psychological mechanisms. Drawing upon
a definition of affect as emotional persuasion, it can be viewed as a type of argument that
is less cerebral and more base.
When such persuasion is married to party identification and infused within
political debate, the results can be detrimental to reasoned discussion. Such partisan
discrimination fuels levels of affective polarization that can, in some cases, be equally as
strong as levels of polarization based on race (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). These
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tendencies are troubling, especially given what social scientists know about the myriad
divisions rooted in race related issues.
Another potentially troubling manifestation of affective rhetoric is embodied
through incivility. In broad terms, incivility can be defined as “rude or impolite attitude
or behavior” (Merriam-Webster 2017). Incivility is of particular interest to political
scientists, given its potential for eroding democratic norms, trust in institutions, and a
healthy political discourse. If the media, presidents, and congresspersons are seen as
progressively mean and nasty, this could diminish citizens’ perceptions of media and
political elites’ ability to reach reasoned, rational, and dispassionate conclusions about
how government should operate. Further, citizens who are averse to (or simply tired of)
constant disagreements, bickering, and nastiness may simply turn away from political
discussion and choose less stressful pastimes.
It is no surprise that the political communication literature is ripe with empirical
studies of incivility’s potentially negative effects on the political process. For example,
incivility depicted on television during political debates has been found to create a
corresponding distrust of government (Mutz and Reeves 2005). Evidence exists of a
negative relationship between discursive incivility and deliberative attitudes such as
open-mindedness and favorable assessments of opposing viewpoints (Hwang 2008).
Further evidence suggests that exposure to increased levels of incivility leads to
decreased political trust and political efficacy (Borah 2013), while even more evidence
points to a demobilizing effect on voters exposed to increased levels of incivility (Wolf,
Strachan, and Shea 2012). Such research represents but a few examples; however, it is
consistent with a wider literature detailing the potential negative effects of incivility.
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At the same time, there is some evidence that the negative consequences of
incivility are not as extreme as others may fear. Brooks and Geer (2007) found that
despite uncivil attacks by political elites being viewed by the public as less fair or less
informative, such behavior did not lead to detrimental effects among the public. Others
have argued that incivility itself is too broadly defined, and that researchers should
instead be measuring more pronounced forms of uncivil behavior, such as expressions of
outrage (Sobieraj and Berry 2011). Regardless of the degree to which incivility has a
negative impact, it must be stressed that the bulk of these studies have been conducted
within the context of the traditional media environment – a context which is markedly
different than the social media environment.
If it is true that affective rhetoric in the form of incivility has potentially
deleterious effects within the traditional media communication environment, it is
reasonable to conclude that similar effects may occur within the social media
communication environment. The main goal of this dissertation is not necessarily to
confirm or debunk the extent of incivility’s deleterious effects on political discourse.
Rather, the main goal is to find evidence of how forms of affective rhetoric and incivility
propagate throughout social networks and, the ways in which such behavior contributes
to political polarization, and – most importantly – how the nature of these relationships
differs when viewed within the context of social media.
Regardless of whether a causal linkage exists that flows from elite polarization,
through elite cues, affective rhetoric, and affective polarization, and results in mass
polarization, the political communications literature can be strengthened by better
understanding how different types of elite cues influence affective polarization in
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different types of interpersonal environments. This understanding is especially important
with respect to how elite cues delivered in a live, confrontational, and politically charged
atmosphere contribute to affective polarization which, in turn, may be creating conditions
that may foster mass polarization in online spaces.

Traditional Media as One-Way Streets
Elite Cues
It is widely accepted that traditional media has the power to shape political
discussion. Much of this power is derived from its role as an agenda setter. Early
research in the study of media effects found the media not only influences what people
think about an issue, but it influences how important people think that issue is. It was
further argued that the power to influence issue salience was in fact the primary effect of
mass media, to such an extent that the power to influence opinion formation was
negligible (McCombs and Shaw 1972). However, such perspectives were challenged by
the demonstration of a causal link between opinion formation and issue salience, built
upon the premise that “the distinction between ‘what to think’ and ‘what to think about’
is misleading” (Entman 1989). Further, opinion formation likely involves a more
complicated process than simply being told what is most important. Rather, opinions are
formed through a process that combines an individual’s prior beliefs, an issue’s
alignment with these beliefs, and perceived issue salience (Zaller 1992).
Given that it is nearly impossible to force someone to adopt a specific position
that they would have otherwise not taken, the more likely route for engaging in
successful agenda setting is through selective dissemination of information. Despite the
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fact that mass media cannot necessarily make people think a certain way, it can influence
what people are thinking about. In turn, opinion formation can be influenced by
promoting the importance of one issue while suppressing or omitting other potentially
important issues.
More recent research indicates that some areas of mass media play a role in
opinion formation that is not necessarily dependent upon issue salience. Specifically,
media bias in editorials has been shown to influence voters’ evaluations of candidates as
well as the choices voters’ make at the ballot box (Druckman and Parkin 2005). While it
is true that media outlets engage in selective dissemination of information (and indicating
what people should think about) by choosing whether or not to publish an editorial on a
particular issue, it is also true that the direct impact of an editorial’s persuasive power on
the merits of an issue can not be ignored. Rather put, while the power to influence “what
to think” flows directly from the power to influence “what to think about”, one cannot
assume that salience alone is sufficient. Once the importance of an issue is
communicated, the way in which the issue is presented or argued will have a direct
impact on the types of opinions that are formed.
Overt bias in the form of editorials is but one way information consumers can be
influenced “what to think”. There is also significant evidence that the ways in which
news is framed plays a central role in how people form their opinions. Such evidence
was presented by Shanto Iyengar (1992), who classified framing as being either thematic
or episodic. According to Iyengar, episodic framing presents and discusses issues within
a narrow or “zoomed in” perspective. Episodic framing often focuses on the immediate
impact on individuals in society, and can often incorporate a dramatic element. A
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popular example of such a news story is of a struggling single mother who must survive
on welfare. Because of the episodic frame, viewers or readers of the story are more likely
to focus on how to help the single mother or other single mothers directly and personally.
Conversely, thematic framing uses a “zoomed out” perspective, typically focusing on an
issue’s broader impact, wider themes, or general implications for society. An example of
thematic framing in a news story might discuss the issue of welfare from an institutional
standpoint, the challenges of funding, or the negative stigma society sometimes applies to
those on welfare. In contrast to episodic framing, which tends to be more easily
accessible, thematic framing is often more abstract and, as such, is often more difficult
for the general population to digest intellectually.
Ultimately, the types of actions people feel must be taken in response to these
news stories depends heavily upon whether they are presented in an episodic or thematic
frame. For example, an episodic frame may lead a viewer to favor actions that occur at
the individual level, such as finding ways to directly assist the single mother on welfare.
Likewise, a thematic frame may lead a viewer to favor actions that occur at the
institutional level, such as welfare reform or more effective application of need-based
social resources. The distinction between episodic and thematic framing matters because
the majority of televised news is presented in episodic frames. As a result, information
consumers are more likely to form opinions that favor an individual-based need agenda
versus an agenda favoring institutional or systemic modifications. Such an agendasetting power by the media is more subtle than selective information dissemination and
editorial bias, but it is no less as effective in its end results.
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Self-selection
It is widely accepted that traditional media engages in agenda setting and that this
behavior is a means by which bias can be expressed. However, the extent to which
traditional media serves a function as gatekeeper of political information must also be
acknowledged. The traditional media’s power as gatekeepers provides it with the
potential to exert a powerful influence on citizens’ political discussions, including
content, intensity, and tone. Traditional media sources decide what information to
provide, how to frame it, and how frequently to provide it. Within this structure,
information consumers have little direct power to influence the content or delivery of the
information provided by information sources.
Despite information consumers having little direct power to influence the content
or delivery of the information provided by information sources, consumers have the
power to choose from a range of available traditional media information sources. While
it is true that information providers may adjust content to meet the perceived expectations
of their audiences, it is also true that an information provider’s slant will influence the
composition of its audience (Levendusky 2013). Such a tendency allows for information
consumers to “self-select” the information they receive, thus allowing them a modicum
of autonomy when choosing the manner in which they are exposed to political
information (Mutz 2006). Opportunities for self-selection increased as the number of
television news providers expanded during the shift from network broadcasts to 24/7
cable news providers in the 1980’s. Still, the range of information consumers’ choices
within the traditional media marketplace has been and remains somewhat constrained,
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while the providers of such information retain a significant amount of discretion
regarding the type of information provided.

The Changing Landscape of Political Communication: Social Media as a Platform
Since its widespread adoption in 2009, Twitter has emerged as a major tool for
sharing political information and for engaging in political debate, all within a 140
character-per-message limit. By 2015, 23% of adult Internet users utilized Twitter, up
from 16% in 2012 (Pew 2015). The demographic characteristics of Twitter users are also
important to note. When measured as a percentage of all Internet users, Twitter users are
disproportionately young (32% between 18-29), urban (30%), and non-white (28% black,
non-Hispanic; 28% Hispanic) when compared to the overall demographics of the United
States (Pew 2015).
The increased use of social media by politicians is a reflection of the increased
use of social media by the American public. In ten short years, the frequency with which
Americans use social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter has increased
dramatically, rising from 7% in 2005 to 65% in 2015 (Pew 2015). As recently as 2012,
34% of Americans used social media to share their thoughts or comments on political and
social issues. Social media users on opposite ends of the political spectrum did so even
more frequently, with 42% of liberal Democrat social media users and 41% of
conservative Republican social media users utilizing such platforms to engage in political
discussion (Pew 2012). The level of engagement on social media did not end with
merely discussing politics; by the end of 2014, 18% of Republican social media users and
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15% of Democratic social media users were actively following candidates for office,
political parties, or elected officials (Pew 2015).
One particularly noteworthy aspect of Twitter that sets it apart from social
networking sites like Facebook is that Twitter allows for a much higher level of
anonymity in its users. While Twitter does prohibit users from impersonating someone
else, it does not prohibit the use of pseudonyms, or “fake names”. This policy is in stark
contrast to Facebook’s “real name” policy, which requires people to “provide the name
they use in real life” so that other users “always know who [they’re] connecting with”
(Facebook 2016). These differences between anonymity policies matter, as recent
research indicates there is a positive correlation between online anonymity and incivility
when discussing “politically sensitive and potentially divisive issues” (Rowe 2015).
The type of social media platform also matters, whether it be Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, or any one of the myriad social network platforms, because different
rules govern the types of interactions users can engage in. As such, these rules have a
direct effect on the types of networked publics that can be shaped within these
environments (Boyd 2010). This is important to acknowledge because it means one
social media platform may foster incivility more readily than another social media
platform, depending upon the extent to which architectural allowances are made for
anonymity. Given the ability for Twitter users to remain anonymous if they choose, it is
possible that the Twitter environment will be more uncivil than online environments that
take extensive steps to verify users’ identities. In turn, one would expect levels of
observed mass polarization to be more pronounced on Twitter than on Facebook. If true,
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this makes Twitter a prime testing ground for the effects of polarizing language on large
scale social networks.
Twitter is also useful for studying mass polarization due to its user networks
being far more flexible and open than user networks on Facebook, due largely to the fact
that Twitter is a predominantly public network. With the rare exception of users with
private accounts, every tweet is publicly visible and available to be viewed by anyone
who searches for the correct hashtag, user, or key words. Conversely, Facebook
networks are largely restricted to those who make an active choice to request – and to be
accepted into – a user’s circle of friends or into a discussion group. While it is true that
content and network analyses can be conducted on Facebook networks, such analyses
provide a perspective of networks that form after an individual has made the conscious
decision to enter into a particular discussion community.
While these differences may seem minor, they have significant implications when
attempting to observe the link between elite polarization, affective rhetoric, and mass
polarization. Part of finding evidence of such a link requires the ability to link elite cues
to the decision-making process in the mass public, and to do so within a measurable
temporal perspective. For example, if a candidate were to make an incredibly offensive
statement on a Monday, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to measure the effect this
had on the decision of individuals to join specific Facebook groups on the following
Tuesday. It would also be difficult (if not impossible) to analyze the extent to which
individuals with differing political ideologies on Facebook either intermingled or became
more polarized. Granted, one could perform focused content analysis within each
Facebook group; however, the power of comparison across multiple groups would be
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nullified. On the other hand, the fluid and open nature of Twitter networks allows
researchers to observe causal effects of elite polarization and affective rhetoric as they
unfold. More importantly, it allows for researchers to observe how communities form in
reaction to such elite behavior as they form, rather than studying these communities after
they have formed. Again, the differences in Twitter and Facebook networks seem minor
at first, but they have significant meaning when viewed within the context of this
dissertation’s main research question.

The Changing Landscape of Political Communication: Social Media and Politics
Social Media and Networked Publics
A brief review of fundamental structural changes in the political communication
environment over the last few decades is helpful in understanding social media’s special
place in this evolution. Newspapers and television news programs are primarily one-way
streets, where journalists have an agenda setting influence through the process of
gathering and disseminating information (McCombs & Shaw 1972). While it is true that
consumers can self-select their sources of information, their power to influence
information content is limited.
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The Internet can be both a one-way or two-way street, as it not only allows
consumers to self-select online sources of information, but it also allows consumers to
share their opinions in the comment sections typically appearing at the end of an online
article (Marchionni 2013). After reading the original author’s article, information
consumers are then able to read the opinions of other readers. While these opinions may
be reviewed by a forum moderator to censor obscene language or hate speech, the content
often lacks the same level of journalistic integrity that is typically expected of most
online news sources. Readers of these comments are thus exposed to sources of
information that are neither vetted, verified, or anticipated by the online publisher or
original author. More importantly, readers – not the author – have power to shape the
story in ways that were previously impossible prior to the introduction of the Internet as a
source of news and opinion.

Social media changes the information sharing dynamic completely, as it fosters a
flexible media environment that is shaped almost entirely by each individual’s choice of
connections. Not only can users shape the social media environment they experience, but
they can also shape the social media environment experienced by others. This
phenomenon has given rise to the notion of networked publics, which are defined as
spaces created by networked technologies where an “imagined collective … emerges as a
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result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice” (Boyd 2010). In this
respect, information consumers have the power to become influential information
providers. This new paradigm shatters the traditional hierarchy of news dissemination
and commentary, allowing active social media participants to become “leaders of opinion
and creators of noise and buzz” (Sebastião 2014).

Social media’s unique architecture requires analysts to rethink conventional
wisdom regarding information gatekeepers and agenda setters. In contrast to the topdown hierarchical information dissemination process of traditional media sources and the
capability for bottom-up information dissemination in the form of user comments on
websites, members of social networks are parts of user generated neighborhoods of
discussion that are largely the result of an individual centric information dissemination
network. Social network users create and expand upon information sharing and
discussion opportunities through a constantly shifting lattice of the user’s network of
connected “friends” and, more importantly, the secondary network of those “friends’
friends”.
Considering the significant structural differences between the traditional and
social media information environments, an examination of mass polarization in social
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media cannot begin and end with only a consideration of elite cues. Rather, equal
consideration must be given to how members of a social network react when exposed to
polarizing messages, with whom those messages are shared, and the extent to which
those messages reach influential members in the network. Doing so provides insight into
how deeply polarizing language is able to penetrate into discussion within a social
network at a given point in time. As a result, it allows for a better glimpse into how
social media networks facilitate mass polarization differently than traditional sources of
information sharing.

Self-selection
The opportunities for members of online social networks to self-select the
information they receive – as well as the people with whom they share information – are
exponentially greater than they are in the traditional media environment. Such control
over self-selection is especially salient when measuring for a relationship between elite
polarization and mass polarization in social media environments. There is little doubt
that social media has fast become a virtual town square for citizens to discuss politics
(Kavanaugh, Perez-Quinones, Tedesco, & Sanders, 2010). As this town square has
become more populated, it has also created increasing opportunities for citizens to be
exposed to elite cues – especially from political candidates and elected officials. This is
due in large part to the fact that the structure of the social media environment and the
methods individuals use to share information are fundamentally different than other
forms of media.
The ability for information consumers to actively choose the type of information
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they receive and the providers who supply it, coupled with the ability to actively avoid
types of information and providers they do not wish to consume, can lead to Internet
users creating a virtual environment consisting mostly of information they agree with
(Sunstein 2001). Also referred to as “filter bubbles” (Pariser 2011), such environments
have potentially negative consequences, as information consumers are able to craft their
own information realities which could favor a disproportionately high percentage of
information with which they agree versus information with which they disagree. One
potential downside of such an outcome is that it can lead to ideological homogeneity in
networks. People in “filter bubbles” ostensibly experience more comfort in being
surrounded by those with whom they agree, yet could be argued to be at a disadvantage
due to being sheltered from attitudes and beliefs that are different than theirs. Clearly,
there are potentially negative implications of such outcomes if one considers the benefits
of ideological diversity.

Elite Cues: Social Media as a Strategic Resource for Political Entrepreneurs
Just as social media has evolved into an inexpensive and powerful tool for the
mass public to share political information and engage in political discussion, the same is
true for political elites. Politicians have modified their communications strategies to take
advantage of the medium as a low cost means to reach potential voters and supporters.
One recent example of how politicians have begun to utilize social media as a low-cost
and high-impact medium occurred during the 2008 Democratic election. As Gainous and
Wagner (2011) observed, Barack Obama’s “Yes We Can” YouTube video was able to
reach a far larger audience at a far lower cost than a competing televised town hall by
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Hillary Clinton. The Obama Campaign seized upon other forms of social media,
including direct text messaging, in order to reach potential voters with very little
investment in campaign finances. Other politicians were quick to note the potential
benefits and incorporated their own social media strategies. By 2012, the use of
YouTube videos was a standard element of most campaign strategies (Gainous and
Wagner 2014), as was the incorporation of other forms of social media like Facebook and
Twitter. This relatively recent and pronounced influx of political elites into the social
media environment cannot be underestimated, as it has most assuredly resulted in an
atmosphere that not only contains more elite cues, but also likely contains increased
expressions of elite polarization.
Political elites’ use of social media as a strategic tool for gaining advantages over
their opponents often extends beyond the act of communicating policy objectives,
attempting to sway potential voters, or striving to turn out the vote. It can also be used to
employ more negative strategies such as those employing fear appeal (Borah 2014) or
personal attacks. In this respect, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have been especially
active on Twitter during the 2016 presidential election. Using the Twitter API to collect
the 3,200 most recent tweets sent by Clinton and Trump as of 10/21/2016, it was found
that Trump’s official Twitter account averaged 12.1 tweets per day since 2/1/2016 and
Clinton’s official Twitter account averaged 24.8 tweets per day since 6/14/2016. The
accusations leveled within these official tweets ran the gamut, including – but certainly
not limited to – verbatim candidate depictions of their opponents as being dangerous,
risky, terrifying, clueless, crooked, corrupt, hateful, shameful, bullies, bigots, whiners,
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and, of course, liars (Twitter 2016). Such an environment provides rich testing grounds
for examining the effect elite polarization may have on mass polarization in social media.

Conclusions
There is a great deal of existing scholarship examining the extent to which elite
and mass polarization is linked; however, the vast majority of this literature examines
such a relationship within the scope of traditional communications environments. Within
this chapter, I have presented an argument for why researchers must take into account the
paradigmatic differences between traditional communication environments and the social
media environment. Not only does the study of social networks require a different
contextual perspective on the part of the researcher, but it also requires a unique set of
tools. In Chapter Three, I outline the reasons why these differences matter when
questioning whether or not elite polarization contributes to mass polarization in social
media and why social network analysis is an effective method for answering this
question. Chapter Three also presents a brief history of the methodological development
of social network analysis, while describing the processes used to gather data and the
specific social network analysis tests employed when testing various aspects of the main
research question in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.
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Introduction
The main research question of this dissertation asks whether or not elite
polarization contributes to mass polarization in social media. As noted in Chapter 1, this
question is pursued through the investigation of three related and more specific questions,
using three individual mixed-methods empirical studies and three unique data sets to
investigate the main research question from three different perspectives.
It is important to note that most large n Twitter studies have focused upon single
conglomerate networks comprised of an aggregation of messages collected over the span
of multiple days, weeks, or months of observations. To be sure, such studies are breaking
ground with respect to our understanding of how mass polarization manifests itself in
social media. While these sorts of data projects have allowed for unique research
questions to be tested rigorously, little has been done in the area of performing extended
time-series sentiment analysis. Specifically, no known works have attempted to use large
scale network analysis methods over an extended period of time by using individual daily
observations as a means for examining how changes in the real-time political climate
influence levels of political polarization in social media networks.
Measuring the frequency of affective rhetoric in social networks is an important
first step in understanding the role such language may play in fostering political
polarization. However, measurements of frequency alone do not tell the full story of how
negative messages impact participants of social networks, where connections between
individuals vary widely depending upon their immediate personal networks as well as the
personal networks of those with whom they are connected. Answering questions such as
these will shed more light on how social networks react and respond to affective rhetoric,
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as well as how this informs our understanding of the relationship between elite and mass
polarization.
With social media, it is less a question of how many times a message is sent; it is
more a question of how deeply that message spreads throughout the network and how
long that message is able to sustain itself. These are defining features of the social media
environment which represent a paradigmatic shift compared to the traditional media
environment. Understanding these differences is a critical part of answering this
dissertation’s question regarding the extent to which elite polarization influences mass
polarization in social media. Social network analysis allows for the identification of
trends in reactions by the mass public in response to elite cues. More importantly, it
allows for an examination of how effectively the mass public’s reactions are disseminated
throughout the communications network. In lay terms, this dissertation probes the
question, “If civility falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it really fall?”
Chapter Three begins with a brief chronological overview of the development of
network analysis methodology in the social sciences. After establishing this context, I
provide a summary of the data sets used in this dissertation, along with how they were
collected and how they were applied to test the hypotheses presented in Chapters Four,
Five, and Six. Additionally, this chapter discusses the different methods used to test each
hypothesis, including content analysis and network analysis.

Chronological Overview of Network Analysis Methodology
Methodological Foundations of Network Analysis: The Pioneers
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The roots of social network analysis can be traced back to J. L. Moreno’s
development of the concept of “sociometry” (1934), which describes social systems as
“attraction-repulsion-neutrality systems” that form as a product of human preferences.
Moreno argues that such human preferential systems do not lend themselves well to
traditional statistical and observational methods that rely heavily upon “objective fact
finding”. Instead, an approach to examining social systems requires a “process of
subjectification” when observing interactions between members of these systems
(Moreno 1934, p 56).
Derived from the field of linguistics, subjectification accounts for contextual
meanings as well as inherent meanings. Such an approach not only accounts for the
preferences of one person, but it accounts for how those preferences relate to the
preferences of others within the same system. Simply put, preferences within an
interactive communications system must be viewed subjectively because they are
dependent on the preferences of others in the system while, at the same time, influencing
the preferences of others. This is directly relevant to analyzing online social networks,
given the nature of networked publics outlined previously in this chapter.
The process of subjectification is at the heart of network visualization and is
primarily expressed through the use of sociogram charts, which provide a physical
representation of individual members of a group during a discrete period of time. It
should be stressed that this picture can change if the temporal period of observation
grows shorter or longer, as the individuals participating in the group may decrease or
increase during different time spans. For example, if a researcher employed the use of
sociograms to analyze the social network structure of students in a high school cafeteria,
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he or she would almost assuredly find different results in a sociogram constructed during
breakfast and one constructed during lunch, just as he or she would find different results
in sociograms constructed during lunch periods on a Monday versus a Friday.
Sociograms are especially useful when examining networks of social interactions
due to their flexibility in observational scope. Researchers can examine social
interactions on a wide range of scales and across a wide range of time frames. Further,
sociograms allow researchers the ability to survey the structure of an entire social system,
identify communities of interest, and examine these communities with greater detail.
Placing this process into the context of modern social network analysis, researchers can
identify tightly clustered groups of discussion, “zoom in” on these groups to identify
individual users, then pull out relevant characteristics of these users to answer more
deterministic questions such as prevailing ideological leanings, frequency in
communication, or participation in other social systems – to name a few.
Moreno’s sociograms provide the basis upon which modern social network
visualization is built. It must be stressed that social network analysis is largely nondeterministic; social network visualizations cannot be read in the same way as one reads a
traditional Cartesian graph. In other words, one cannot isolate an individual within a
sociogram and reach immediate conclusions based upon the size or “X/Y” grid location
of that individual. Instead, the size and location of the individual within a sociogram
must be interpreted in relation to other individuals within the sociogram. In contrast to
the deterministic nature of traditional graphs, social network analysis is based upon
relationships and, more importantly, the power of strong, interconnected, and influential
relationships within a defined system.
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Social Network Analysis Renaissance
Few major developments occurred within the study of social networks for several
decades following Moreno’s initial work. Some of the more notable contributions
included research by Lévi-Strauss (1951) on rules governing kinship systems and work
by Haray (1959) in the area of sociometric matrices analysis. Despite these significant
steps forward in the mathematical foundations of social network analysis, the field went
largely ignored by the social sciences. Perhaps the most impactful scholarship to
originate from the 1950’s school of social network analysis came from communications
studies pioneer Everett Rogers’s Diffusion of Innovation (1962), in which Rogers
expanded upon concepts initially presented in Moreno’s original 1934 work.

The Modern Era of Social Network Analysis
Despite these early advancements, there is a relative scarcity in volume of
academic literature on social network analysis prior to 1990. As Bernard observes, “20
articles about social network analysis [are] listed in Sociological Abstracts” between the
years 1960 and 1975. Conversely, “from 1990 to 2005, the number [is] over 3,000”
(2005). Clearly, social network analysis gained traction within numerous areas of social
research. Given the geometrically multiplying increases in computing power during the
1990’s and through the 21st Century, it is likely that this sudden surge in academic study
was largely facilitated by the availability of inexpensive and powerful computers capable
of putting mathematical theory into practical action.

44
More recent work has been successful in clearly defining social network analysis
as an organized paradigm. A prime example of such literature is found in Linton
Freeman’s Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science
(2004), in which Freeman defines social network analysis as consisting of four features.
First, social network analysis does not focus on the attributes of actors, but rather upon
the connections between actors. Second, social network analysis is built upon systematic
data collection that focuses upon these ties. Third, social network analysis is strongly
reliant upon the use of graphical representations. Last, social network analysis is
dependent upon mathematical and computational tools to “make sense of the welter of
information” that describes these ties (Freeman 2004, p 3). Modern social network
analysts employ these techniques as a means for identifying trends in structural
patterning; the structure of a network tells researchers a great deal about the patterns of
speech, discussion, and relationships.
The emergence of social media – and of Twitter in particular – has provided a
wealth of new opportunities to utilize social network analysis tools as a means for
studying human behavior. Social network analysis goes far beyond the ability to produce
“eye candy” in the form of striking and often beautiful visualizations. Social network
analysis draws upon empirical data to provide context for relationships between
individuals and, in doing so, reveals insight into issue trends, influential participants, and
a treasure map for learning more about their predominant characteristics. In this respect,
social network is a powerful tool for organizing massive amounts of empirical data and
allowing the analyst to identify and focus upon empirical data that is most germane to his
or her research question. Today, social network analysis is an invaluable tool for making
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sense of the millions of interactions that occur on an hourly basis across multiple social
network platforms.
Increasing numbers of researchers have enjoyed improved access to powerful
social network analysis tools in recent years, due largely to the convergence of social
media’s widespread popularity with researchers’ access to progressively powerful
computers at reasonable costs. Such a convergence allows social network analysts in the
“Twitter Age” to design research frameworks capable of sufficiently accommodating
Freeman’s four features of social network analysis. Twitter data provides information on
the connections between actors and an application program interface (API) that allows for
systematic collection of this data, while modern personal computers have the ability to
process complex algorithms and convert them into graphical representations of social
networks containing tens of thousands of actors. Additionally, powerful software is
readily available that allows these graphics to be presented in a manner that clearly
illustrates where neighborhoods of discussion form in relation to each other.
Despite the availability of such tools, academic contributions in the field of social
network analysis have been sparse until recently. As Williams, Terras, and Warwick
(2013) observed, only three academic papers published in 2007 focused upon Twitter in
some form or another. This number rose to eight in 2008 and 36 in 2009, with the
volume of academic research increasing significantly in the 2010’s. It is likely that these
increases was due to a combination of several factors. First, the 2010’s saw a boon in the
availability of progressively powerful and increasingly inexpensive hand-held mobile
smart devices which were ideal for using a lightweight and easy-to-use application like
Twitter. Second, researchers enjoyed a concurrent rise in computing power alongside a
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corresponding drop in cost. Third, third-party software developers began releasing
numerous inexpensive open-source tools allowing researchers to access the Twitter API
at little to no cost to the researcher.
As social network analysis has gained more acceptance within academia,
researchers have begun to focus on the issue of political polarization in social media.
Early examples include studies examining the extent to which Twitter users cross
ideological lines (Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith 2013) and challenge conventional
wisdom with respect to media echo chambers (Barberá et al. 2015). These studies have
represented valuable efforts to examine and quantify the nature of mass polarization and
filter bubbles in social media. There are also increasing numbers of studies drawing upon
large n datasets spanning several months worth of Twitter messages, many of which are
designed to better understand how political information is shared and discussed within
social media networks as a whole (Gruzd 2014; Morales 2015).

Instant Effects during High Stakes Political Events
This dissertation examines the relationship between elite polarization and mass
polarization in social media through different temporal lenses. Chapters Four and Six test
this question using very broad time horizons, measuring shifts in daily sentiment over the
span of hundreds of days. However, Chapter Five tests this question using a
comparatively small time horizon, measuring shifts in minute-by-minute sentiment over
the span of a 100-minute presidential debate. Without a doubt, there is value in
identifying shifts in sentiment over broad time horizons, as this offers to reveal trends
with staying power. If a particular sentiment predominates for multiple days, it could
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indicate a high level of salience. At the same time, broad time horizons are limited when
it comes to measuring the mass public’s reaction to specific types of elite cues. When
measuring daily shifts in sentiment, the researcher must make a best guess as to the
primary independent causal variable, given that a great deal of information is
disseminated throughout a single day within the 24/7 news cycle.
Conversely, when measuring minute-by-minute shifts in sentiment, the researcher
is equipped with far higher resolution when it comes to identifying the causal
independent variables. Recent research in the field of political communication has
focused on the phenomenon of hybrid media events, wherein social media is used
alongside and during televised political events. Referred to as “dual screening”, the
viewing public expands its role from being a mostly passive consumer of information to
being an active member of the political event itself. These roles often involve members
of the general public using social media to engage in “lay tutelage” behavior, including
the acts of fact-checking, correcting, counter-claiming, or highlighting biased reporting
(Vaccari, Chadwick, & O’Loughlin 2015). Within this environment, the power of event
participants to shape the narrative increases in proportion to their relative influence when
measured by their number of active followers. In such a scenario, these event
participants may serve as “bridging elites” with an influential power that can rival that of
media and political elites (Freelon & Karpf 2015).
Other recent research has examined ways in which collective patterns of behavior
on social media during media events differ from behaviors observed in traditional media
contexts. One such example with particular relevance to this dissertation found a
multitude of notable behavioral characteristics among individuals who engage in “dual
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screening” during media events (Lin et al. 2014). Specifically, individuals who engaged
in social media communication during televised political events exhibited significantly
lower levels of interpersonal communication. There was also a tendency for individuals
to exhibit a higher level of concentrated attention to topics, while also engaging in far
more “re-tweeting” and replying. Most significantly, Lin et al. found that elites tended to
be the predominant beneficiary of these sorts of behaviors.
Findings such as these have been extremely valuable in better describing and
explaining the roles individuals play in politically charged social media environments, as
well as the types of individuals who play these roles. At the same time, more needs to be
known regarding how elite messages originating in the traditional media environment
shapes the network structures that facilitate social media participants’ roles, whether they
be participating in a bridging elite, lay tutelage, or passive observer function.
Specifically, a better understanding of the nature of how these network structures shift
can provide valuable context for interpreting the relative influence of participants
regardless of their roles.

Data Collection
This dissertation draws upon an original data set created by accessing the Twitter
API via the NodeXL Excel template (Social Media Research Foundation, 2017) on a
daily basis from September 1st, 2015, through February 1, 2017. The full data set used in
the three empirical chapters of this dissertation consists of approximately 13,000,000
tweets and 260,000,000 words. This data is part of a larger daily collection regimen
which (at the time of this writing) conducts searches for nearly 40 unique names,
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hashtags, or Twitter accounts, allowing for the curation of approximately 250,000 tweets
per day. While other options exist for conducting Twitter API searches, NodeXL was
chosen due to its ability to perform a wide range of search functions while keeping the
financial costs to the researcher extremely low.
A primary limitation of using the Twitter API for data collection is that the results
returned for high-frequency search terms represent a sample of approximately 1% all
tweets during the specified search time frame. According to Twitter, these results are “a
statistically relevant sample”. Such a rather vague explanation is somewhat bedeviling to
social scientists, as it limits the ability to establish the extent to which this ostensibly
“random” data is representative of the larger population.
Recent research indicates that data acquired via the Twitter API may not be very
random after all. For example, when comparing data sets compiled through multiple
Twitter API searches, Joseph et al. (2014) found that on average, more than 96% of
tweets found in one sample were also found in all other samples. Despite such
similarities, the content found in the subset of non-matching samples did not differ
significantly in terms of tweet structure or user popularity. It should be stressed that such
limitations apply to any scientific study using high volumes of data acquired via the
Twitter API.
Given that Twitter operates as a publicly-traded for-profit business, it is likely that
Twitter has a financial motivation for not allowing potential business competitors to have
insight into the nature of their randomization models, or any other type of proprietary
algorithms or code. It is also worth noting that use of the Twitter API seems to be the
preferred method for social media researchers, as the only option for avoiding Twitter’s
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black box of “statistically relevant samples” is to pay for access to the Twitter “firehose”
or to purchase data from companies specializing in storing hundreds of billions of
archived historical tweets. Such access allows researchers access to every single tweet
ever sent, typically acquired by purchasing a given volume of tweets (e.g. 100,000)
mentioning a give key term (e.g. “Donald Trump”) over a given time frame (e.g.
11/1/2016 – 11/31/2016). While such an option provides researchers with the ability to
fine-tune the creation of their data sets without needing to perform daily searches, it is
also an option that is often prohibitively expensive.
In sum, while there are limitations with respect to how representative the Twitter
API’s “random” data is of the larger population, these limitations are shared by most
researchers in the social sciences. Rather than being a condition that disqualifies the
validity or generalizability of results obtained through Twitter API data, it is more of a
caveat to be considered when analyzing the results of any study using such data.

Content Analysis
Content analysis is a valuable method for quantifying the frequency of words in
bodies of text. Typically, content analysis utilizes specialized dictionaries which
organize words within specific categories. Through this process, various meanings and
themes within the text begin to emerge. Content analysis is used in this dissertation in
two main ways. First, I use content analysis to measure positive and negative sentiment.
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Second, content analysis is used to measure the frequency of words expressing specific
types of reactions, including emotional and higher-level thought processes.
The primary tool for conducting content analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software
application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill
University. This software was used in conjunction with the Lexicoder Semantic
Dictionary (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2016) and the Regressive Imagery Dictionary
(Martindale 1975, 1990). The Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary draws upon a dictionary of
approximately 5,000 words and is designed to measure the positive and negative
sentiment in political texts. The Regressive Imagery Dictionary is comprised of
approximately 3,000 words divided into three primary categories with 44 sub-categories.
These categories are divided into Primary Processes, which include drive, sensation,
defensive symbolization, regressive cognition, and Icarian imagery; Secondary Processes,
which include abstraction, social behavior, instrumental behavior, restraint, order,
temporal references, and moral imperative; and Emotions, which include positive affect,
anxiety, sadness, affection, aggression, expressive behavior, and glory. The
aforementioned categories are used in this dissertation to provide a more accurate
measurement of affective rhetoric. Measuring specific types of thoughts and emotions
(such as abstraction and aggression) provides an element of specificity that is more
precise than mere positive and negative sentiment.
Content analysis is performed by processing text obtained via daily NodeXL
searches of the Twitter API through Lexicoder 3.0. The initial results provided by
Lexicoder 3.0 are in the form of raw frequency counts. However, given fluctuations in
total volume of total tweets observed on individual days, the use of basic frequency
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counts lacks descriptive accuracy. Rather put, a measurement of 100 occurrences of
positive words on a day with 10,000 total words is substantively different than a
measurement of 100 occurrences of positive words on a day with 20,000 total words.
Hence, an essential step in content analysis involved converting raw frequency counts
into rates by dividing them into the total number of words tweeted during each day of
observation. In order to improve the comparative utility of these rates, they are reported
as “rate of anxiety per 1,000 words”, “rate of aggression per 1,000 words”, and “rate of
negativity per 1,000 words”.

Time-series Analysis
Measuring temporal relationships between actions by political elites and reactions
by the mass public is a central part of testing the main research question of this
dissertation. Social media provides an excellent environment for testing whether or not a
relationship exists between elite and mass polarization because of its ability for the mass
public to express their instant reactions to comments made by political elites. Timeseries analyses were a natural choice for such tests, especially given the rich and
extensive data sets that were collected during the composition of this dissertation. Time
series analysis is especially useful for examining trends, as well as for identifying
potential cause and effect relationships. If it is true that certain types of elite cues elicit
polarizing types of behavior in the mass public, evidence of such relationship will
become evident if repetitive patterns emerge through time-series analysis.
Time series analysis is used in this dissertation to measure for shifts in sentiment
and affective rhetoric in several ways. In Chapter 4, I use time-series analysis at the
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macro level, by drawing upon 366 daily observations spanning 7 different candidates
over a full calendar to test for cause-and-effect relationships between proximity to a
presidential primary election or debate and a resulting rise in mass affective rhetoric. In
Chapter 5, I use time-series analysis at the micro level by analyzing each individual
minute of tweets captured live during the first presidential debate.
In Chapter 6, I use time-series analysis to test for the existence of the proposed
“Trump Effect”, which argues that controversial remarks by Donald Trump during the
primary and general elections were encouraging aggressive behavior in some Americans
while creating fear and anxiety among others. Time-series analysis is performed by
measuring specific reactions in the mass public to especially controversial remarks made
by a high profile political elite: Donald Trump. In sum, time-series analysis can be a
valuable tool for testing temporal relationships between multiple variables. This
dissertation takes advantage of the methodological flexibility of time-series analyses to
measure such relationships within the scope of a variety of unique political scenarios.

Network Analysis
The empirical studies presented in subsequent chapters make extensive use of
network metrics and network visualizations created with Gephi 0.8.2 for Macintosh,
which an open source and multiplatform application especially designed for creating
visual graphs of any type of network. It must be stressed that social network analysis is
primarily about relationships between people and groups. These relationships are
observable through the use of both descriptive network metrics and visualizations.
Network analysis is especially useful for answering questions about mass political
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behavior in social network environments because it allows researchers to observe
relationships in a way that is not feasible through traditional means such as survey data or
regression models.

Network Visualization
Gephi is an especially useful tool for testing the hypotheses posed in this
dissertation because it allows for a comparison in networks between days with high rates
of polarizing language and days with low rates of polarizing language. Such differences
are manifested either by graphs demonstrating clusters of mostly unconnected discussion
on the fringes of the network map or graphs demonstrating a high concentration of
interconnected nodes near the center of the network. In this respect, daily variances in
network architecture serve as dependent variables, while the rates of polarizing language
serve as the independent variables. If it is true that polarizing behavior on the part of
elites causes polarizing behavior in the mass public, such tendencies can be observed in
the shape and structure of groups within these networks, as well as through an
examination of shifts in network metrics.
Social network analysis allows researchers to identify links between the types of
discussion occurring within social networks and the resulting neighborhoods they form.
This is an especially important aspect to keep in mind when interpreting network
visualization graphs. A cursory understanding of how Gephi accomplishes this is
important for making the most sense of the network visualization portion of the
dissertation.
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First, a specially formatted data file is imported into Gephi. The very least the
software requires is a “node” (or the sender, receiver, or re-tweeter of a message) and an
“edge” (or the connection between two nodes), to which Gephi assigns what can best be
described as magnetic values to the nodes and edges. In simplest terms, nodes repel each
other while edges draw nodes together. This repulsion is especially strong where
individual nodes with no edges are concerned. The net result (after many hundreds of
algorithmic iterations) is that as the number of nodes and edges in a network increase, the
forces of attraction and repulsion create a picture of areas in the network where the web
of communication is most dense. As a result, nodes that are more interconnected with
other nodes form “neighborhoods” of discussion and, in doing so, create a stronger
gravitational force that repels smaller “neighborhoods” of nodes.
These neighborhoods are of special interest because they define areas where
people are gathering in virtual spaces. Since the data sets for this dissertation are built
around specific search terms (e.g. “Donald Trump” or “Hillary Clinton”), these
neighborhoods illustrate where people are gathering to discuss a particular candidate.
More importantly, it can bee seen whether communication is predominantly occurring
between influential members of the network, or whether it is more widely dispersed
amongst less influential members of the network. An explanation of the network metrics
used to estimate influence is outlined in the following subsection.
Network analysis – when combined with content analysis – provides a picture of
both the nature of political discussion and the efficiency with which this discussion
spread throughout members in the network. For example, if content analysis on a
specific date demonstrates a relatively high rate of aggressive affective rhetoric, but
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network analysis suggests a weakly connected network, one could infer that the impact of
such rhetoric has been mitigated. Conversely, if content analysis alone was used in this
scenario, the more likely inference would have been an overestimation of the aggressive
rhetoric’s overall impact on members in the network as a whole. Simply put, content
analysis provides valuable aggregate measures – but network analysis puts these
aggregate measures into context by taking into account the critical variable of network
structure.

Network Metrics
While there are a wide range of methods available for testing various
characteristics of networks, this dissertation focuses primarily upon metrics describing
the frequency, centrality, and influence of members in a given network. Of these three
measures, centrality and influence are especially critical to this dissertation’s research
question, as they provide additional information that goes beyond the aggregate measure
of frequency. Frequency is most easily defined as the volume of messages originating
from or being directed to an individual member of the network. Centrality is measured
by using network visualization to observe an individual’s relative location within the
wider network, using the methods described in the previous subsection. Influence is
measured by calculating the influence of an individual within a network based upon the
influence of the people he or she is connected with.
These measures matter in the social media communication environment because
frequency is not the same as influence – nor is it the same as centrality. These
differences are important because Individual A may have a large number of immediate
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connections, but if those connections are not influential, Individual A’s relative influence
in the network is limited. Conversely, Individual B may have a small number of
immediate connections who are very influential and, in such a scenario, Individual B
would likely have far more influence in the network than would Individual A.
Acknowledging and testing for these differences is a critical aspect of this dissertation
because it accounts for network dynamics that enhance or diminish the frequency of a
message. A message may appear relatively frequently, but if it is not shared with
influential or central members in a network, the impact of the message will be
diminished.
The primary network metrics used in this dissertation to test influence and
centrality are Average Community Size and Average Path Length. Average Community
Size provides an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are in
the network. This metric is calculated by first running a modularity algorithm. Generally
speaking, modularity is a measure of a network’s tendency to gravitate towards clusters
of communities. High modularity values suggest the existence of more sophisticated
internal structures and, in turn, help describe how a network is compartmentalized into
sub-networks (Blondel et al. 2008). Accounting for modularity matters because it
provides concrete values when looking for evidence of mass polarization. Networks with
high average community sizes indicate a tendency of individuals in a particular network
to cluster together around certain topics, themes, or pieces of information and, in turn, are
consistent with polarized behavior.
Average path length provides an indication of a network’s efficiency by providing
a measure of how easily messages can travel throughout a given network. It is best
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understood as a measurement of the number of steps it takes for a message to travel
across a network (Brandes 2001; Albert and Barabási 2002; Newman 2003).
Specifically, a message originating from one member (node) in a network and
terminating with another member (node) in a network represents a path length of one. A
message originating from one member (node) in a network, being received by a second
member (node) in a network, and being sent to a third member (node) in a network
represents a path length of two. It should be noted that in this second example, the path
length is still two even if the intermediary member (node) sends this message to multiple
other members before the message reaches its terminus.
In order to establish context for average path length values, I report these values
as a percentage of network diameter. In brief, network diameter is defined as the longest
path distance between any two members (nodes) in a network. As such, it provides one
estimation of the network’s overall size. Since network diameter varies from graph to
graph, so too does the relative value of the average path length. For example, members
of a network with an average path length of 3 and a diameter of 3 are far more
interconnected than members of a network with the same average path length of 3 but
with a diameter of 6. Such a measure is particularly useful to investigating this
dissertation’s research questions because it helps identify networks which are conducive
to homophily. Specifically, networks with low average path length to network diameter
ratios indicate the likelihood of smaller and potentially polarized clustering of network
members. As is the case with each of the network metrics used in this dissertation, this
measure is best used in conjunction with other network metrics. It is unlikely that a
single network metric can best describe network structure on its own. Rather, the most
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accurate assessment of a network’s dynamics is best attained by accounting for multiple
characteristics.

Conclusion
This dissertation relies heavily upon a mixed-methods approach combining large
scale data collection, extensive content analysis of hundreds of millions of words across
nearly two years of daily observations, and creative application of cutting edge network
visualization tools. While time-series analyses are extremely useful in measuring for
trends or cause-and-effect relationships, network analysis helps to put any such findings
into context. Analyzing social networks requires special attention to be given towards
relationships and, more importantly, how the strength of relationships modify the
influence and centrality of messages being sent and received. This purpose of this brief
chapter has been to familiarize the reader with the methods used for analyzing these
relationships in order to maximize their descriptive power in addressing the main
research question of this dissertation. Each of the following empirical chapters employs
network analysis methods in a slightly different way to provide three unique perspectives
on the relationship between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media.
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Dissertation Chapter 4

Trolling Twitter:
Social Network Patterns of Affective Rhetoric during the 2016 GOP Presidential Primary

Eric C. Vorst
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Introduction
In this first empirical chapter, I test the theory that as a political event draws
nearer, there will be an increase in the general combativeness among those who discuss
politics. This is similar to a “big game” effect, where people argue about sports near the
Super Bowl or World Series. The 2016 Republican primary provided an excellent testing
ground for this chapter, as the primary featured an initial field of 19 viable candidates.
The unpredictable and often volatile nature of the primary field was magnified by the
candidacy of businessman Donald Trump.
This chapter first tests the proposition that the use of affective rhetoric in social
networks is positively correlated with its temporal proximity to a political event.
Additional tests are performed to determine if a political figure’s ranking in national polls
increases the quantity of affective rhetoric. This first set of tests are designed to answer
the first half of a two-part question that recurs in subsequent chapters: “Does it happen?”
Second, this chapter tests how social networks react to increases in affective
rhetoric. As has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is ample evidence demonstrating the
nature and structure of the social media communication environment is significantly
different than the nature and structure of traditional communication environments. While
prior studies have examined the effects of affective rhetoric in traditional environments,
very few have done so within the unique communications environment of social media.
In brief, the second set of tests within this chapter were designed to measure the extent to
which increases in affective rhetoric in the aggregate impacted the reach and influence of
such rhetoric. This second set of tests were designed to answer the second half of a twopart question that recurs in subsequent chapters: “Does it matter?”
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Research Questions
In order to test for a link between the proximity to a political event and a
subsequent rise in social network polarization, this chapter investigates two sequentially
dependent research questions. Specifically, the first research question looks for a causal
link between politically-charged events in the “real world” and rises in affective rhetoric
on social media, while the second research question measures how the unique nature of
social networks impact the extent to which any such effects matter.

Research Question #1:
Does the proximity to a political event result in an increase in affective rhetoric in
social media?

Research Question #2:
Do participants in open social networks tend to self-police especially
controversial forms of affective rhetoric?

Hypotheses

Hypothesis #1: The use of polarizing language in social networks is positively
correlated with its temporal proximity to a political event.
Hypothesis #2: Online social networks tend to sequester unproductive messages
in favor of constructive debate.
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Data and Methodology
Data Collection: NodeXL
Data for this chapter was gathered by using NodeXL to perform a search for each
of the top three GOP presidential candidates over the span of 366 consecutive days
during the primary election season. The full data collection consisted of 1,047 individual
data sets, with a total number of observations tallying roughly 8.4 million tweets
consisting of approximately 160,000,000 words.
The data returned from these searches was comprised only of messages sent
roughly within the preceding 24 hours, so it was essential to engage in these searches
every single day over the seven month span of the data gathering process. These searches
were often hampered by idiosyncrasies of the NodeXL data collection process, including
unpredictable search interruptions due to shifting Twitter volumes. For example, in some
cases searches would be cut short due to the NodeXL API shifting into a “summary”
mode to account for extremely high volumes of Twitter data at that given time, while in
other cases simple fluctuations in Internet connectivity could trigger the software to end
collection. Further, Twitter sets a limit to how many free requests for data can be made
during a set period of time, which was a cause for frequent concern. However, due to an
unyielding tenacity in data collection, the vast majority of daily observations ranged from
between 5,000 and 25,000 tweets.
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Candidate Search Terms
The selected search terms focused on the candidates’ full names (e.g. “Donald
Trump” or “Jeb Bush”) rather than their Twitter tags (e.g. “@realDonaldTrump” or
“@JebBush”) in order to filter out tweets that were coming directly from the candidate
themselves. Actual candidate tweets have been collected separately using a search term
that only gathered messages being sent from their official Twitter account. This approach
allowed me to approach the data from an alternate perspective. First, it allowed me to
focus only on people who were talking about the candidates, rather than including
messages from the candidates themselves. Second, it placed the focus on the semantic
content of the tweet rather than the “tagging” process. Rather put, I wanted to look at
how people talked about these candidates when using their names in a sentence that was
not necessarily “tagged” with the candidate’s Twitter name (e.g. @realDonaldTrump).
Another way to view the difference is to describe it as looking at how people talk about
someone, rather than how they talk to someone.
Admittedly, the process of examining how people talk about someone (e.g.
“Donald Trump”) versus how people talk at someone (e.g. “@realDonaldTrump”) is not
entirely in line with conventional approaches to studying Twitter communication. After
all, the foundation of personal identity on Twitter lies in the ampersand tag; Donald
Trump’s personal identity on Twitter is “@realDonaldTrump”, not “Donald Trump”.
Further, the vast majority of studies on Twitter communication focus on users’
ampersand tags as the point of reference. However, the field of social network analysis is
one that invites researchers to approach questions from alternative perspectives. There
are few known formal studies on how people communicate differently on Twitter when
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talking about someone versus talking at someone. This dissertation will offer a first step
in this line of inquiry, thus opening up opportunities for future research.

Content Analysis
Content analysis was performed to determine the total number of positive and
negative words within the individual data set for each candidate on each day of
observation. Positive and negative words were chosen as a proxy for affective language,
which can be an indicator of polarization (Iyengar 2012). The primary tool for
conducting the content analysis was Lexicoder 2.0, a Java-based software application
developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill University. This
software was used in conjunction with the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, which is
designed to capture the sentiment of political texts. The Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary
does so by assigning a positive or neutral value to a defined set of over 3,500 words.
After text is processed through Lexicoder 2.0 and the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary, a
raw count of total positive and negative words per tweet was produced. These counts
were collected, compiled, and recorded for each of the candidates’ daily data sets. In
order to make these numbers more usable, they have been reported as “positive words per
1,000 words” or “negative words per 1,000 words”.1
While positive and negative words have the potential to highlight affective
language, mere positive and negative language alone cannot account for some of the most
polarizing types of language. As such, I selected for analysis one of the most profane
words in the English language: the “F Word” (or “F*ck”). It should be noted that the

1
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different incarnations of this word are not always necessarily negative in tone. Indeed,
this word is often used to express joy, happiness, confusion, excitement, or any number
of emotions that are not expressly negative. However, this word represents the epitome
of vulgarity and profanity and, as such, serves as a valuable proxy for analyzing affective
rhetoric, regardless of the tone with which it is used.
A basic Excel “find and replace” function was used to gather a raw count of how
often any variation of the “F Word” appeared in each of the 105 individual days of
observation across all three candidates. A wildcard symbol was used at the end of the “F
Word” in order to capture as many variations of the word as possible, such as “F*cks”,
“F*cker”, “F*cking”, “What the f*ck”, and so on.

Methods
Time Series Analysis
Hypothesis #1 and the first half of Hypothesis #2 were tested using a battery of
time-series analyses measuring the rise and fall of affective and uncivil language in
proximity to a political event. The dependent variables measured include the rate of
affective language and the rate of extremely uncivil language. The independent variables
are represented by the days during which a primary debate or primary election occurred.
I record the estimated viewership of each debate and the delegates at stake on each
primary election date in order to place its political importance in context. The logic
behind this decision is that debates with higher viewership and primary elections with
more delegates at stake are likewise more important political events. If there is a positive
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relationship between political events and mass polarization, we should see a spike in the
use of uncivil or affective language on these dates.
Given the wide time frame of daily observations gathered over a full year, it was
necessary to identify time frames within the primaries. Simply put, it is difficult to create
a timeline that is easily interpreted when observing 366 data points in time. In order to
best present the time-series data, I divided the primary season into three individual stages.
One unintended benefit of this approach is that it allowed me to isolate and compare three
different phases of the primary season, each of which featured distinctly different levels
of competitiveness.
The first phase was called the “Cattle Call Stage” (9/1/2015 – 1/31/2016) and was
a period during which there were six different candidates who occupied a top three spot
in the Real Clear Politics polling average at any given time. The “Cattle Call Stage”
featured six televised debates, but there were zero primary election dates. The second
phase was called the “Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016) and was a period which
tracked four candidates who reached a top three spot in the Real Clear Politics polling
average. The “Competitive Stage” featured five televised debates and eleven primary
election dates. The third and final phase was called the “Confirmation Stage” (4/1/2016
– 6/30/2016) and was a period during which the same three candidates consistently rested
in the top three spots of the Real Clear Politics polling average. There were zero
televised debates during the “Confirmation Stage”; however, there were nine primary
election dates.
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Network Analysis
The second half of Hypothesis #2 was tested using Gephi for Mac, which is an
open source and multiplatform application especially designed for creating visual graphs
of any type of network.2 It is worth stressing again that social network analysis is
primarily about relationships between people and groups. Social network analysis allows
for the identification of links between the types of discussion occurring within social
networks and the resulting neighborhoods they form. This is an especially important
aspect to keep in mind when interpreting network visualization graphs, as their
interpretive power lies in comparative relationships rather than in absolute Cartesian
values.
Gephi is an especially useful tool for testing Hypothesis #2 because it allows for a
comparison in networks between days with high rates of affective rhetoric and days with
low rates of affective rhetoric. Such differences are manifested either by graphs
demonstrating clusters of mostly unconnected discussion on the fringes of the network
map or graphs demonstrating a high concentration of interconnected nodes near the
center of the network. In this respect, daily variances in network architecture serve as
dependent variables, while the rates of polarizing language serve as the independent
variables. Additionally, Gephi is an extremely useful tool for isolating specific types of
language and identifying the areas of networks where such language occurs. Network
visualization graphs are also used to test Hypothesis #2 by analyzing the extent to which
members of Twitter networks using extreme forms of affective rhetoric are successful in
gaining visibility and influence for their messages.

2

See Chapter 3
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Results and Analysis
Hypothesis #1: The use of polarizing language in social networks is positively correlated
with its temporal proximity to a political event.

When testing Hypothesis #1, results suggested that there is a moderate and
positive relationship between rates of affective language usage on a given day and its
proximity to a political event. During the “Cattle Call Stage” (9/1/2015 – 1/31/2016),
positive and negative word usage rate increased following 5 of 6 debates (83%), while “F
Word” usage rate increased slightly during 3 of 6 debates (50%). During the
“Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016), positive and negative word usage rate
increased either on or immediately following 7 of 11 primary election dates (64%) and 3
of 5 debates (60%), while “F Word” usage rate increased either on or immediately
following 8 of 11 primary election dates (73%) and 5 of 5 debates (100%). During the
“Confirmation Stage” (4/1/2016 – 6/30/2016), positive & negative word usage rate
increased either on or immediately following 6 of 9 primary election dates (67%), while
“F Word” usage rate increased either on or immediately following 7 of 9 primary election
dates (78%).
Initial results also suggest there is a moderate and positive relationship between
rates of affective language usage and the importance of a political event. When looking
at all primary election dates (2/1/2016 – 6/7/2016), the rate of “F Word” usage in tweets
mentioning Donald Trump increased on election dates with 50 or more delegates at stake
in 11 of 12 cases (92%). Conversely, rates of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning
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Donald Trump increased on election dates with fewer than 50 delegates at stake in 4 of 8
cases (50%). During the “Competitive Stage” (2/1/2016 – 3/31/2016), the rate of “F
Word” usage in tweets mentioning Donald Trump increased surrounding the debates
preceding Super Tuesday (3/1/2016). The rate of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning
Donald Trump spiked significantly on Super Tuesday (3/1/2016) and continued to do so
for each subsequent primary election date during March. During the “Confirmation
Stage” (4/1/2016 – 6/30/2016), the rate of “F Word” usage in tweets mentioning Donald
Trump decreased and remained stable after he became the sole remaining primary
candidate (5/10/2016). A notable exception was found on 6/12/2016, which was the date
of the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida. On this date, Donald Trump
registered the 2nd highest rate of “F Word” usage out of almost 900 daily observations in
the data set.
In sum, time series analyses of the Hypothesis #1 provided consistently
compelling support for a temporal relationship between affective rhetoric and a political
event. Affective rhetoric in the form of positive and negative sentiment rose significantly
during or immediately following days where a primary election or primary debate
occurred. Increases in the rates of “F Word” usage aligned even more frequently with
the same political events. Even stronger support for Hypothesis #1 was found when
accounting for the relative importance of a political event. This was most evident when
comparing primary election dates where fewer than 50 delegates were at stake with dates
where 50 or more delegates were at stake.
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Hypothesis #2: Online social networks tend to sequester unproductive messages in favor
of constructive debate.

The first set of tests of the second hypothesis employed the use of network
visualization graphs across a span of individual days of observation. This battery of tests
was designed to identify differences in the overall shape and organization of networks
with high and low incidences of extreme affective rhetoric: the “F Word”. These tests
were designed to provide a broad contextual picture of these networks’ structures and, in
doing so, provide visual evidence of their overall connectivity and density. Such
contextual evidence is important because varying levels of density and connectivity are
signs of varying levels of network polarization. First, I used Gephi for Macintosh3 to
create network visualizations for days with the five highest rates of “F Word” usage and
days with the five lowest rates of “F Word” usage. Such an analysis is not intended to
provide conclusive predictive powers, but rather is intended to demonstrate how
unmoderated social networks behave differently when comparing periods of extremely
high affective rhetoric to periods of low affective rhetoric.
[Insert Visualization 1.1]
The first set of visualizations compare days with the top five most frequent use of
the “F Word” alongside days with the top five least frequent use of the “F Word”. When
comparing the visualizations side by side, it is clear that the networks are indeed different
in structure, density, and neighborhood dispersion. This is evident in the visualizations in
the first row (representing the days with the highest rates of the “F Word”), which
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demonstrate relatively small yet dense clusters of discussion dispersed throughout the
peripheral regions of the networks. Additionally, the surrounding spaces in these
networks is littered with large collections of “one-step” nodes, where individuals are
either sending or receiving a message one time and no more. Last, there is little space
between the communications in the center of the network and the largely unconnected
ring of nodes encompassing the perimeter of the network. This suggests that there are
fewer nodes in the center of the network and fewer connections between communications
in the center of the network and surrounding neighborhoods of discussion. In turn, there
is less of a repulsive force on surrounding nodes with few to no connections (indicative
of non-influential members in the network).
Conversely, visualizations in the second row (representing the days with the
lowest rates of the “F Word”) demonstrate relatively large clusters of shared
conversation. Further, the surrounding space consists largely of smaller neighborhoods
of conversation connected directly to the larger central conversation. Last, the largely
unconnected ring of nodes encompassing the perimeter of the network is, in most cases
pushed, further out from communications in the center of the network. This suggests that
there are more connected nodes in the center of the network and more connections
between communications in the center of the network and surrounding neighborhoods.
As a result, there is more of a repulsive force on surrounding nodes with few to no
connections. These differences in network structure are more clearly evident when
viewing the visualizations in higher resolution:
[Insert Visualization 2.1]
[Insert Visualization 2.2]
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[Insert Visualization 2.3]
[Insert Visualization 2.4]
[Insert Visualization 2.5]
A final set of visualizations was created in order to locate these highly polarizing
messages, examine their content, and identify their position with relation to the larger
network of conversation and its influential participants. The following visualizations
isolate specific tweets containing the “F Word” by changing the color and size of nodes
containing these words. Doing so makes it easier to identify their location with respect to
the center of discussion.
[Insert Visualization 3.1]
[Insert Visualization 3.2]
[Insert Visualization 3.3]
[Insert Visualization 3.4]
[Insert Visualization 3.5]
Isolating messages with the “F Word” and illustrating their position with respect
to the center of discussion produced some fascinating results. When examining the days
with the top five rates of “F Word” usage, it was found that messages containing the “F
Word” were clustered outside of the center of discussion in all cases. While the number
of tweets with the “F Word” may have increased in the aggregate, they were not shared
with influential members of the network. As such, the impact and reach of these
expressions of extremely affective rhetoric failed to gain influence in discussion about
Donald Trump on these days.
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These findings are important because they demonstrate two key points. First, they
demonstrate that frequency does not equal influence in the social media environment.
After analyzing the dates with the five highest rates of “F Word” usage (out of 366 days
of observation), in no case did tweets containing the “F Word” successfully enter the core
of shared discussion. Instead, in every instance these dense bubbles of extremely
affective tweets were sequestered by members of the network. Second, these findings
provide valuable insight into the behavior of unmoderated and unfiltered networks.
Rather put, these findings provide evidence of “self policing” on the part of Twitter users
when it comes to extremely vulgar language. As such, there is compelling evidence of an
aversion to such types of language among those who wish to discuss, share, and even
debate content related to a major political figure.

Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter has presented evidence that social networks experience both
increases in positive and negative language as well as extremely polarizing and
unproductive words as a political event nears. A candidate’s movement in the national
polls has some influence, but this appears to be moderate in comparison. Most
importantly, there is strong evidence that despite an increase in such language, members
of social networks tend to sequester such language in favor of constructive debate.
Strikingly, such behavior is exhibited in the absence of significant controls over the
content of the message or the anonymity of the messenger, which suggests there may be
an element of “self policing” inherent in large, public, and open online social networks.
The findings in this chapter could be considered as cause for a modicum of optimism in a
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highly polarized climate where an inordinate amount of attention is often given to the
loudest voices, and where perhaps a bit too much worry is wasted on the Twitter Trolls.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that this chapter examined these
relationships within the context of a primary election. This context matters, because the
nature of U.S. presidential primary elections is vastly different than the nature of U.S.
presidential general elections. These differences are both fundamental and significant, as
they include (but are not limited to) different campaign strategies, different election
schedules, different media coverage, and different levels of citizen involvement. The
nature, effects, and impact of these differences could – and likely do – influence the
nature, effects, and impact of political discussion on social media. While subsequent
chapters in this dissertation examine two aspects of the U.S. presidential general election,
they do so while testing different hypotheses than were presented in this chapter. This
provides several opportunities for future research examining whether the “big game
effect” varies when comparing the unique battlegrounds of the U.S. presidential primary
and U.S. presidential general election political environments.
As social media continues to grow as a platform for individuals to gather, process,
share, and debate political issues, its potential for affecting mass polarization also grows.
Measuring how the frequency of affective rhetoric on social media changes over time
with relation to the occurrence of a political event is an important step in better
understanding how elite cues influence mass polarization in different information
environments. More importantly, measuring how social networks treat affective rhetoric
provides valuable insight into whether increases in such language will have a net negative
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effect on constructive debate, or whether it will be pushed to the fringes where its
audience will be smaller and less influential.
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Graph 1.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 1.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 1.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 1.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and
Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Positive and negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis
software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 2.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 2.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 2.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis
software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 2.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and
Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of positive and negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content
analysis software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 3.1: Comparing frequency of “F words” in tweets1 mentioning Republican primary
candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of “F words” in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis software.
Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 3.2: Comparing frequency of negative affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of negative words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis
software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 3.3: Comparing frequency of positive affect in tweets1 mentioning Republican
primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of positive words in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content analysis
software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Graph 3.4: Comparing frequency of combined positive and negative affect in tweets1
mentioning Republican primary candidates and proximity Republican Debates and
Primaries

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
160,373,816 words and 8.4 million tweets
Notes:
1
Frequency of positive and negative in tweets identified using Lexicon 2.0 content
analysis software. Frequency is measured in number of occurrences per 1,000 words.
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Visualization 1.1: Comparing Network Structure1 in Days with Highest Rate of “F Word”
to Days with Lowest Rates of “F Word” Usage

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 2.1: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with Highest Rate of “F Word”
to Day with Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/17/2016) – 7.87 per 1,000 words

Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (4/17/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 2.2: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 2nd Highest Rate of “F
Word” to Day with 2nd Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage
2nd Highest Rate: Donald Trump (6/12/2016) – 4.88 per 1,000 words

2nd Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (12/22/2015) – 0.00 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 2.3: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 3rd Highest Rate of “F
Word” to Day with 3rd Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage
3rd Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/18/2016) – 4.09 per 1,000 words

3rd Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (10/27/2015) – 0.00 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 2.4: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 4th Highest Rate of “F
Word” to Day with 4th Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage
4th Highest Rate: Donald Trump (4/6/2016) – 3.97 per 1,000 words

4th Lowest Rate: Marco Rubio (3/11/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 2.5: Comparing Network Structure1 in Day with 5th Highest Rate of “F
Word” to Day with 5th Lowest Rate of “F Word” Usage
5th Highest Rate: Donald Trump (3/15/2016) – 3.44 per 1,000 words

5th Lowest Rate: John Kasich (3/19/2016) – 0.00 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualizations created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 3.1: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective
Rhetoric on Day with Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Donald Trump (4/17/2016) – 7.87 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 3.2: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective
Rhetoric on Day with 2nd Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Donald Trump (6/12/2016) – 4.88 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 3.3: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective
Rhetoric on Day with 3rd Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Donald Trump (4/18/2016) – 4.09 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 3.4: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective
Rhetoric on Day with 4th Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Donald Trump (4/6/2016) – 3.97 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Visualization 3.5: Analyzing Network Centrality and Influence1 of Extreme Affective
Rhetoric on Day with 5th Highest Rate of “F Word” Usage
Donald Trump (3/15/2016) – 3.44 per 1,000 words

Source: Twitter (9/1/2015 – 8/31/2016)
1
Visualization created using Gephi 0.8.1 for Macintosh
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Dissertation Chapter 5

The Instant Effects of Confrontation, Controversy, and Contempt:
A live-stream analysis of mass polarization on Twitter during the 2016 presidential
debates

Eric C. Vorst
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Introduction
The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign was marked by a daily onslaught of disputes
between Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, and their surrogates. Whether these
confrontations involved e-mails, tax returns, the Russian government, reality television,
temperament, white supremacist groups, health issues, a history of misogynistic behavior,
or one of a number of other seemingly endless controversies, they all seemed to share a
common tone in their discourse: contempt. This atmosphere of relentless confrontation,
controversy, and contempt took center stage during each of the three presidential debates
and in front of record-breaking television audiences, leading many to ask whether such
visible divisiveness on the part of political elites may have contributed to mass
polarization.
This chapter measures the real-time effects of elite polarization on social
networks by drawing upon an original data set of approximately 1,500,000 tweets
captured live during the first 2016 U.S. presidential debate. I measure shifts in sentiment,
network dynamics, and neighborhood structure during the one-minute time frame
immediately following especially controversial or confrontational candidate statements
and exchanges. The nature of these causal relationships offers unique insight into the
influence polarizing messages by elites may have on mass polarization, especially when
observed in a live and extremely politically charged atmosphere.

Instant Effects during High Stakes Political Events
Recent research in the field of political communication has focused on the
phenomenon of hybrid media events, wherein social media is used alongside and during
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televised political events. Referred to as “dual screening”, the viewing public expands its
role from being a mostly passive consumer of information to being an active member of
the political event itself. These roles often involve members of the general public using
social media to engage in “lay tutelage” behavior, including the acts of fact-checking,
correcting, counter-claiming, or highlighting biased reporting (Vaccari, Chadwick, &
O’Loughlin 2015). Within this environment, the power of event participants to shape the
narrative increases in proportion to their relative influence when measured by their
number of active followers. In such a scenario, these event participants may serve as
“bridging elites” with an influential power that can rival that of media and political elites
(Freelon & Karpf 2015).
Findings such as these have been quite valuable in better describing and
explaining the roles individuals play in politically charged social media environments, as
well as the types of individuals who play these roles. At the same time, more needs to be
known regarding how elite messages originating in the traditional media environment
shapes the network structures that facilitate social media participants’ roles, whether they
be participating in a bridging elite, lay tutelage, or passive observer function. Further, a
better understanding of the nature of how these network structures shift can provide
valuable context for interpreting the relative influence of participants regardless of their
roles.

Research Design
This chapter examines the extent to which polarizing behavior on the part of elites
within a live and politically charged environment influences online spaces in a way that
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creates conditions where mass polarization may develop. The analysis in this chapter is
unique, as it offers a perspective that is both immediate and unfiltered. Further, it takes
place in an environment where the variable of participant self-selection has less influence
than would be the case in a traditional media setting. First, individuals’ choice in their
media source for the debate has virtually no impact on the way in which the political
information is being received. Rather put, the content of elite cues is delivered in an
unbiased and direct manner, regardless of whether an individual watches the debate
unfold on Fox News, MSNBC, CNN, or some other channel. An individual cannot
choose to receive these cues from a source that aligns with their ideology, as competing
views are part and parcel of a televised debate. Second, individuals’ reactions to elite
cues are being observed in an unfiltered and ideological neutral environment.
Specifically, reactions are only observed for individuals who have shared their messages
using the official Twitter hashtag for the 2016 presidential debates.

Research Questions
In order to test for a potential link between elite polarization and mass
polarization in these unique dual environments, this chapter investigates two sequentially
dependent research questions. Specifically, the first research question looks for the
effects of elite cues in online spaces, while the second research question measures how
the unique nature of social networks impact the extent to which any such effects matter.

Research Question #1: How do polarizing messages by elites influence the
nature of political discourse in online spaces?
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The first section of this chapter seeks to determine if there are any relationships
between expressions of polarizing behavior on the part of political elites and a resulting
reaction among individuals that could indicate the seeds for mass polarization are being
sown. Using the first presidential debate as my testing grounds, I identify moments
during the debate where either of the two candidates made statements that could be
perceived as confrontational, controversial, or contemptuous. These moments are used as
proxies for the independent variable of elite polarization. Levels of affective rhetoric and
abstract thought in individuals’ tweets during each minute of the debate are used to
measure the extent to which the preconditions for mass polarization are developing or
diminishing at different moments during the debate. Finally, a time series analysis is
utilized to determine if moments of confrontation, controversy, or contempt on the part of
the two candidates result in a shift in frequency of affective rhetoric or abstract thought
on the part of individuals watching the debate live. In essence, the first section seeks to
answer the question: “Does it happen?”

Research Question #2:
How does the nature of political discourse in online spaces influence the creation
of polarized communities?

While the first section of this chapter looks for causal links between polarizing
messages by elites and shifts in mass affective rhetoric, the second section of this chapter
seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between shifts in mass affective
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rhetoric and the formation of polarized communities of discussion. Drawing upon
periods with high rates of affective rhetoric in tweets, I conduct network metrics analyses
to measure the size of communities of discussion and the relative efficiency of the
networks within which these communities form. These metrics provide evidence as to
the relative levels of polarization within a given network at a given time. If evidence of
polarized communities exist, this would suggest mechanisms exist which would facilitate
a causal link between elite polarization in the form of elite cues and mass polarization in
social media. Further, this approach may provide even further clarity regarding the
extent to which different types of elite cues lead to different types of mass polarization in
social media. In essence, the second section seeks to answer the question: “Does it
matter?”

Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt cause an
instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in viewers’ responses.
Hypothesis #2: Environments with elevated levels of affective rhetoric are
conducive to the creation of polarized communities.

Methods and Data
Data Collection
Data for this chapter was gathered using the Twitter Live Stream function in
Gephi version 0.9.1 for Macintosh. All tweets containing #Debates2016 were collected
roughly five minutes before the start of the debate and continuing through approximately
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one hour of post-debate discussion. The decision to track #Debates2016 was based upon
Twitter’s announcement that this would be their official hashtag for the 2016 presidential
debates. For this analysis, I truncated the full data set of all #Debates2016 tweets to
include only those occurring from the start of the debate through approximately six
minutes following the debate’s conclusion. The reasoning for this was two-fold: First, I
assumed that discussion regarding the final minute (94) of the debate would continue for
several minutes. Second, examining a full 100 minutes of debate reactions provided a
balanced scope for data analysis allowing for an economical time frame divisibility.
During the debate, a time log was kept to document the tweet count at each one minute
mark, beginning with Lester Holt’s first comment welcoming the audience to the debate.
Following the debate, the truncated data set of approximately 1,500,000 tweets
was divided into 100 individual one-minute data sets of approximately 15,000 tweets
each. Official transcripts for the debate were studied carefully to identify moments of
confrontation, controversy, and contempt, then these moments were time stamped by
synchronizing them with the official video of the debate. The first presidential debate
had no shortage of such moments, so effort was made to choose the most obvious and
egregious cases.
[see Appendix A]

Content Analysis
The primary tool for conducting content analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software
application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill
University. This software was used in conjunction with the Regressive Imagery
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Dictionary (Martindale 1975, 1990), which is comprised of approximately 3,000 words
divided into three primary categories with 44 sub-categories. These categories are
divided into Primary Processes, which include drive, sensation, defensive symbolization,
regressive cognition, and Icarian imagery; Secondary Processes, which include
abstraction, social behavior, instrumental behavior, restraint, order, temporal references,
and moral imperative; and Emotions, which include positive affect, anxiety, sadness,
affection, aggression, expressive behavior, and glory.4 For this project, I selected the
Emotions category as a proxy for affective rhetoric. I also selected the Secondary
Processes category as a proxy for the opposite of affective rhetoric. Including this second
category provided a valuable comparative measure to provide context for the analysis of
affective rhetoric in the form of emotional responses.
[Insert Table 1.1]
The full text for each minute of observation during the debate was processed
through Lexicoder 3.0 and the Regressive Imagery Dictionary, producing 100 individual
data sets containing raw counts for each of the 14 Emotion and Secondary Process
subcategories. These raw counts were then converted into rates by dividing them into the
total number of words tweeted during each minute of observation. In order to make these
numbers more usable, they have been reported as “positive words per 1,000 words” or
“negative words per 1,000 words”.

Network Analysis

4

See Chapter 2
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Several network metrics were utilized to measure for signs of relative polarization
between networks. First, I tested for modularity and average community size, as these
measures provide an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are
in the network. Generally speaking, networks with high levels of modularity feature
communities of discussion containing dense internal connections and weak external
connections to other communities of discussion. Measures of average community size
are especially useful when analyzing two or more networks with each other, as this
provides a tool for comparing the tendency of individuals in a particular network to
cluster together around a certain piece of information.
Second, I tested for closeness centrality distribution and average path length, as
these measures provide evidence of a network’s efficiency. Generally speaking,
networks featuring clusters of nodes with high closeness centrality and with low relative
average path lengths tend to be more efficient networks. For example, a network with a
closeness centrality distribution of 1 and an average path length of 1 would be a system
of perfect information, where each participant would receive the same amount of
information in only one step. Conversely, a network with a closeness centrality
distribution of close to 0 and an average path length of 6 would be a system where
information required a number of steps to travel across the network and where very few
participants would be exposed to the same information.
Last, I used network visualization techniques to provide a big picture view of each
network’s architecture. While network visualizations are less precise than traditional
network metrics, they can help to illustrate shifts in the networks as a whole. For
example, a dense and interconnected network with a great deal of shared information will
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be evident by tight clusters of nodes near the center of the visualizations, while polarized
and disconnected networks will be evident by relatively large clusters of nodes appearing
sporadically near the periphery of the larger network.

Findings
“Does it happen?”

Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt cause an
instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in viewers’ responses.

The first test of this hypothesis involved a contextual view of how rates of
emotion and secondary process words rose and fell over the span of the debate. Rates of
words expressing emotion were used as broad proxies for affective rhetoric, while rates
of words expressing secondary processes were used as broad proxies for objective
discussion. The main goal of this first test was to get a “lay of the land” to see if there
were any identifiable patterns in tweet content and, more importantly, to see if these
patterns aligned with any of the preselected moments of confrontation, controversy, or
contempt during the debate.
[Insert Graph 1.1]
The first time series analysis showed a clear flow of sentiment shifts throughout
the debate, both for the emotion and secondary process categories. Interestingly enough,
rates of secondary process language were generally higher than rates of emotional
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language. This was surprising considering the heated nature of the first presidential
debate. It was also interesting to note that rates of secondary process language peaked
during the middle of the debate, while rates of emotion peaked near the end.
Such trends could have been due to at least two causes. First, it is possible that
the content of the candidates’ speech was more policy oriented, less charged with
rhetoric, and more thought-provoking, due to the types of questions asked by the
moderator. Given that television is still largely an entertainment medium, it would not be
surprising if moderators (who are typically also network news anchors) intentionally
order the type and content of their questions in order to create a better “show” for the
audience. Second, it is possible that candidates strategically inserted a higher frequency
of emotional cues during the beginning and end of the debate in order to maximize
rhetorical impact during periods of the debate where viewers’ attention was more
focused. Both possibilities are intriguing and could be tested by comparing the content of
Lester Holt’s questions with an analysis of the content of the candidates’ responses. Such
a content analysis could be performed using the excellent Laver and Garry Dictionary of
Policy Position (1992). These interesting observations aside, only rates of emotion were
examined closely in the time series analysis, as this provided the best means for testing
the first hypothesis most directly.
[Insert Graph 1.2]
[Insert Graph 1.3]
The time series analysis of emotion rates in tweets was conducted using two
graphs. The first reported the combined rate of all seven sub-categories of words
expressing emotion from the Regressive Imagery Dictionary, while the second the rates

111
for each individual sub-category. The purpose of this approach was to provide the
opportunity to identify trends in overall emotion while also having the ability to focus on
specific types of emotions that may have been driving overall shifts in the wider
category.
Sentiment was relatively flat until the first moment where Clinton accused Trump
of rooting for the housing crisis, to which Trump responded “That’s called business, by
the way.” There were only slight shifts in emotion rates, driven primarily by expressions
of anxiety and glory. A more noticeable upward trend in rates of emotion occurred
following Minute 18, following a period of crosstalk between the candidates which ended
with Clinton stating, “Well, Donald, I know you live in your own reality.” This was
driven primarily by increases in expressive behavior and positive affect.
Even more noticeable increases in rates of emotion occurred immediately
following Minute 28, where the issues of Trump’s tax returns and Clinton’s e-mails took
center stage. These increases were influenced by significant increases in anxiety and
sadness. The shift in rates of sadness was interesting, as prior to this point in the debate
rates of sadness were at or slightly above 0. Rates of emotion also trended upwards
significantly following Trump’s claim that “Secretary Clinton doesn’t want to use a
couple of words, and that’s law and order” and the subsequent debate topic shift to the
issue of “stop and frisk” starting at Minute 43. These increases were driven by upward
trends in the rates of glory, affection, expressive behavior, and sadness. Interestingly,
rates of anxiety remained at 0 during this topic.
Rates of emotion remained fairly steady with very few fluctuations in rates
following this interchange and continuing through disputes over which candidate was
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responsible for promoting the “birther” controversy, accusations of racist behavior,
disputes regarding the role of Russia in the hacking of the Democratic National
Committee e-mails, and confrontational moments involving Trump’s position that he did
not support the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These patterns in tweet content remained
consistent through Minute 78.
To be clear, rates of emotion and secondary process did not flat line during this 30
minute period, as rate fluctuations varied by as much as 50% from any given minute to
the next. Further, there were noticeable shifts in the rates of individual emotions. For
example, rates of anxiety increased at to their highest rates at Minute 47 following
Clinton’s comment, “I've heard Donald say this at his rallies, and it's really unfortunate
that he paints such a dire negative picture of black communities in our country”, to which
Trump responded, “Ugh.” This interchange was accompanied by an increase in rates of
anxiety from 0 to 0.273 per 1,000 words (674% above the average rate of anxiety for the
entire debate). There was also a corresponding spike in words related to expressive
behavior following the dispute between Clinton and Trump regarding whether or not
murders in New York City increased following the end of “stop and frisk” policies.
These instances aside, fluctuations on the whole did not align clearly and consistently
enough with the identified moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt to draw
any conclusions. This could be due to a number of factors, not the least of which would
involve the fairly high frequency with which these moments occurred during this 30
minute stretch. Rather put, the almost constant disagreements on a wide range of issues
during this period may have created an atmosphere of “background noise”.

113
If the 30 minute segment of the debate featuring a high frequency of back and
forth exchanges on multiple issues created a form of background noise, the final 15
minutes were punctuated by two of the most memorable moments of the debate – both of
which involved arguably the most controversial statements and confrontational
atmosphere, as well as the strongest expressions of contempt. Specifically, these closing
minutes of the debate began with the following statements made by Trump at Minute 78
(and 18 seconds):
“Well, I have much better judgment than she does. There’s no question about
that. I also have a much better temperament than she has, you know? … I think
my strongest asset, maybe by far, is my temperament. I have a winning
temperament. I know how to win.”
Clinton responded to Trump’s one-minute long discussion about temperament
with a few playful wiggles of her shoulders, followed by an amused and somewhat
exasperated “Whew!” at Minute 79. This interchange elicited by far the most impressive
increases in rates of emotion in tweets, rising from a rate of 0.696 per 1,000 words during
Minute 77 to rates of 1.221 and 1.270 per 1,000 words during Minutes 78 and 79, and
peaking at a rate of 6.555 per 1,000 words during Minute 80. This represented a 942%
increase in the rates of emotion in tweets from the moments before Trump began
discussing his temperament to the moments after Clinton’s response. These increases in
the rate of emotion were primarily driven by extreme increases in the rates of aggression
and positive affect in tweets. Specifically, between Minute 77 and Minute 80, rates of
positive affect increased from 0.0502 per 1,000 words to 0.6741 per 1,000 words
(1,343% increase) while rates of aggression increased from 0.424 per 1,000 words to
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5.443 per 1,000 words (1,284% increase). Rates of aggression and positive affect at
Minute 80 were both at their highest recorded levels for the entire debate, indicating that
this interchange had by far the biggest emotional impact on the #Debates2016 Twitter
participants.
Rates of emotion in tweets remained high for several minutes after this
interchange, staying well about the average rate of emotion over the entire span of the
debate. However, the second of the two most memorable moments of the debate aligned
with Clinton’s scathing criticism of Trump’s attempts to “switch (the discussion) from
looks to stamina” at Minute 91, and the ensuing confrontation:
Clinton: “this is a man who has called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone
who has said pregnancy is an inconvenience to employers, who has said …”
Trump: “I never said that.”
Clinton: “women don’t deserve equal pay unless they do as good a job as men.”
Trump: “I didn’t say that.”
Clinton: “And one of the worst things he said was about a woman in a beauty
contest. He loves beauty contests, supporting them and hanging around them.
And he called this woman ‘Miss Piggy.’ Then he called her ‘Miss
Housekeeping,’ because she was Latina. Donald, she has a name.”
Trump: “Where did you find this? Where did you find this?”
Clinton: “Her name is Alicia Machado.”
Trump: “Where did you find this?”
Clinton: “And she has become a U.S. citizen, and you can bet…”
Trump: “Oh, really?”
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Clinton: “… she’s going to vote this November.”

This interchange between the two candidates, starting at Minute 91 and
continuing through Minute 92 (and 30 seconds) aligned with a spike in emotion in tweets
from 1.185 per 1,000 words to 2.597 per 1,000 words, representing an increase of 219%
in one minute. Rates of emotion in tweets remained above average for the final minute of
the debate following this confrontation. These increases in emotion rates were likely
driven by increases in the individual measures of aggression, anxiety, glory, and positive
affect.
The initial results of the time series analysis provided some support for the first
hypothesis, as there were clearly some interchanges that elicited instant emotional
responses in individuals discussing the debate on Twitter as it unfolded live on television.
However, these results were mixed, as there were moments during the middle third of the
debate where no definitive relationship was evident.
These mixed initial results could have been due to the one-minute time frame of
observation being too fine of a unit of measurement; it is possible that some debate
moments do not lend themselves well to precise measurements in minutes and seconds.
Instead, such moments may be better defined as periods of exchange, rather than specific
statements. Further, the one-minute time frame of measurement could exclude the
responses from individuals who do not respond within 60 seconds. Rather put, while
some debate viewers might have responded instantly on Twitter, others might have taken
a minute or two to access their phone or computer and might have taken even more time
to type out their responses. In order to account for the potential for observation error
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when using a one-minute time frame as the unit of measurement, an alternate approach
was used when analyzing the time series data.
[Insert Graph 1.4]
[Insert Graph 1.5]
For this brief follow-up analysis, I isolated four distinct segments within the
debate where there were especially focused confrontational, controversial, or
contemptuous interchanges between the candidates. These segments were six minutes in
length, and consisted of interchanges between the candidates involving Trump’s taxes
and Clinton’s e-mails (Minutes 28 – 33), the issue of law and order (Minutes 42 – 47),
the issue of temperament (Minutes 78 – 83), and the “words matter” segment centering
on Donald Trump’s statements about women (Minutes 90 – 95). I also isolated two
additional segments to be used as control sets: the opening moments of the debate
(Minutes 1 – 6) and the segment of the debate when rates of emotional language in
#Debates2016 tweets were at their lowest and steadiest (Minutes 13 – 18).
When examining the time series graph using six-minute segments as the
dependent variable, a clear pattern emerged with respect to the moments of the debate
which elicited the strongest emotional responses from the #Debates2016 audience. The
four largest and most consistent spikes in rates of emotional language were centered
around the “temperament”, “words matter”, “law and order”, and “taxes and e-mails”
candidate interchanges. These findings, when combined with the first set of findings,
lend strong supporting evidence for Hypothesis #1: Moments of confrontation,
controversy, and contempt cause an instant increase in the rates of affective rhetoric in
viewers’ responses.
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“Does it matter?”

Hypothesis #2: Environments with elevated levels of affective rhetoric are
conducive to the creation of polarized communities.

On their own, the findings that there were increases in emotional language in
Tweets following moments of confrontation, controversy, and contempt were not all that
surprising. However, establishing evidence of such a relationship is an important
precondition for testing the second hypothesis. For the second section of this analysis, I
used network analysis metrics and visualizations to gain a better understanding regarding
the nature and structure of the discrete networks that form in response to moments of
confrontation, controversy, and contempt and, more importantly, facilitate increased rates
of affective rhetoric in individuals’ responses.
For this analysis, I chose to test the same five segments from the second half of
the time series analysis. This decision was based upon the reasoning that too fine a level
of detail would potentially create similar observational inconsistencies as were
experienced in the first time series analysis. Confining the network analysis observations
to a one-minute time frame reduced measurement of the independent variable to a single
candidate statement, rather than taking into account the full content of an exchange
between candidates or the development of a candidate’s argument or defense. Further,
given that the resulting networks are the product of individuals’ comments, it was likely
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that confining the analysis to one-minute time frames would hamper the value of the
dependent variable by omitting contributions by individuals who took more than 60
seconds to access their phone or computer and to post their responses to Twitter.

Visualizations
Given that the second hypothesis seeks to find a relationship between elevated
levels of affective rhetoric and the formation of polarized communities, the visualizations
were analyzed by comparing the network with the lowest rate of emotional language
(Minutes 13 – 18) with the networks containing the highest rates of emotional language
(“Taxes & E-mails”, “Law & Order”, “Temperament”, and “Words Matter”). Using rates
of emotional language as a proxy for affective rhetoric, there should be noticeable
differences in the general structure of these four networks compared to the control sample
network.
[Insert Visualization 1.1]
[Insert Visualization 1.2]
[Insert Visualization 1.3]
[Insert Visualization 1.4]
When analyzing each of these “high emotion” debate segments with the “low
emotion” control segment, there were some notable differences. For example, while
there were several clustered communities appearing outside of the center of discussion,
these were not located relative far from the center. Additionally, these clusters had
several clear connections with each other, suggesting that a measure of communication
was occurring between them. Conversely, visualizations for the four “high emotion”
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debate segments featured a higher number of clustered communities appearing outside of
the center of discussion. Further, these clusters were closer to the periphery of the
network while demonstrating fewer connections with other clusters. This suggests these
networks were somewhat more polarized than the network for the control segment.
While network visualizations are often useful analytical tools for examining
interactions between individuals in a networked environment, there are times with such
an analysis is limited in its descriptive power for testing hypotheses. Ultimately, while
the comparison of network visualizations immediately following each of the five debate
themes did illustrate variations in network architecture as a whole, these comparisons did
not provide robust descriptive power for indentifying the formation of polarized
communities. This could have been due to a combination of the high volume of tweets
and the small time frame within which these tweets were being made.

Comparative Network Metrics
A final battery of tests was applied in order to look for evidence of network
polarization during different segments during the debate. Such evidence was sought by
measuring changes in network efficiency and community density. Rather put, if the
network during a particular six-minute segment was less efficient (indicated by high
average path lengths) and more dense (indicated by high average community sizes) than
another six-minute segment, this would suggest a stronger likelihood of concentrated
polarization in the former segment than in the latter.
[Insert Graph 1.6]
[Insert Graph 1.7]
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[Insert Graph 1.8]
Where the network visualizations did not provide the most robust evidence of
shifts in network polarization during varying periods of emotional language by network
participants, the comparative network metrics analysis provided some compelling
evidence. This evidence is particularly evident in Graph 1.7, which measures relative
efficiency and intensity of the networks during different segments of the debate.
Generally speaking, networks with high average path lengths are less efficient for
sharing information, as an increase in path length means information must make a higher
number of “jumps” between one node to the next. Networks with an average path length
of 1 represent an environment of perfect information, as all messages in that network
reach all other nodes in that network in one step. Average path length can also be viewed
as one indicator of polarization, since the network as a whole becomes more unified as
this value decreases and becomes more dispersed as this value increases.
Average community size can be viewed as one indicator of network
concentration, as it measures the average number of nodes connected within a shared
neighborhood. In essence, these two values are best interpreted as a pair: Networks with
high average path lengths and high average community sizes suggest high levels of
concentrated polarization, while networks with low average path lengths and low average
community sizes suggest low levels of diffuse polarization. Similarly, networks with
high average path lengths and low community sizes suggest high levels of diffuse
polarization, while networks with low average path lengths and high average community
sizes suggest low levels of concentrated polarization.
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This analysis provides strong evidence to support Hypothesis #2, as the two
debate segments which elicited the highest rates of emotional language also produced the
two highest combined measures of average path and average community size.
Specifically, the networks that developed in the wake of the “temperament” and “words
matter” interchanges were marked by especially concentrated polarized communities of
discussion. Such findings are especially noteworthy considering these two segments also
contained arguably the most emotionally charged and personalized interchanges of the
debate. Conversely, the “lowest emotion” segment of the debate produced the lowest
combined measures of average path and average community size, while the “debate start”
segment (representing the segment with the second lowest rates of emotion) produced the
second lowest combined measures of average path and average community size.

Conclusions and Discussion
The first goal of this chapter was to determine whether a relationship exists
between polarizing behavior in the form of elite cues and increases in mass affective
rhetoric. There were clear relationships between moments of confrontation, controversy,
and contempt between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during the first presidential
debate and subsequent rises in affective rhetoric in the form of emotional language
among #Debates2016 participants on Twitter. This was especially evident in the
emotional subcategories of positive affect and aggression. By offering evidence to the
question of “Does it happen?”, this finding provides a valuable tool for testing whether or
not there exists a causal chain between elite polarization and mass polarization in social
media.
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The second goal of this chapter was to determine whether or not elevated levels of
affective rhetoric in the form of emotional language shape the architecture of the
networks in a way that is conducive to mass polarization. Significant evidence was found
indicating that moments of intense confrontation, controversy, and contempt correlated
with indicators of polarized networks. This was especially true for moments where
interchanges between the candidates included especially personal character attacks. It
should be stressed that while this evidence does not demonstrate the existence of mass
polarization in response to exposure to elite polarization, it does demonstrate that elite
polarization can influence the creation of polarized communities which could, in turn,
facilitate affective polarization. In doing so, such evidence warrants a closer look into the
nature of communication that is occurring within these polarized communities. Such an
approach is pursued in Chapter 5.
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Appendix A: Moments of Confrontation, Controversy, and Contempt during the first
2016 U.S. Presidential Debate
12:00 Trump: “That’s called business, by the way”
(12) (Clinton said Trump “rooted for the housing crisis”)
13:45 Clinton: “Donald thinks that climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese”
(14) Trump: “I did not. I did not. I do not say that.”
…
Trump: “She talks about solar panels. We invested in a solar company, our
country.
That was a disaster.”
15:40 Trump: “You’ve been doing this for 30 years.”
(16-18)
[CROSSTALK]
NAFTA “is the single worst trade deal ever approved in this country.”
17:20 Trump: “You haven’t done it in 30 years or 26 years” etc
[CROSSTALK]
Clinton: “Well, that’s your opinion. That is your opinion.”
18:20 Trump: “You called [the TPP] the gold standard.”
(18)
[CROSSTALK]
Clinton: “Well, Donald, I know you live in your own reality,”
[CROSSTALK]
Holt: “We’re going to move to …”
25:30 Clinton: “Trump loophole”
(26)
[CROSSTALK]
“Trumped up trickle down”
Debt free college
28:00 [Holt begins Q&A about Trump releasing his tax returns]
(28)
30:00 Trump: “I will release my tax returns, against my lawyer’s wishes, when she
releases her
33,000 e-mails that have been deleted.”
31:00 Clinton: “Maybe he’s not as rich as he says he is.”
“Maybe he doesn’t want the American people … to know that he’s paid
nothing
in federal taxes.”
Trump: “That makes me smart.”
Clinton: “it must be something really important, even terrible, that he's trying to
hide.”
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33:00 Clinton: “I made a mistake using a private e-mail.”
(33) Trump: “That’s for sure.”
[more talk about tax returns]
36:00 Clinton: “And maybe because you haven't paid any federal income tax for a lot of
years.”
(36)
37:00 Clinton: “Do the thousands of people that you have stiffed over the course of your
business not deserve some kind of apology from someone who has taken
their
labor, taken the goods that they produced, and then refused to pay them?”
43:00 Trump: “Secretary Clinton doesn't want to use a couple of words, and that's law
and
(43)
order. And we need law and order. If we don't have it, we're not going to
have
a country.
45:00 [Stop and Frisk]
47:00 Clinton: “I've heard Donald say this at his rallies, and it's really unfortunate that
he paints
(47) such a dire negative picture of black communities in our country.”
Trump: “Ugh.”
51:30 Trump: “I agree … I think we have to look very strongly at no-fly lists and watch
lists.”
52:00 Trump: “you were the one that brought up the words super-predator about young
black youth”
53:00 Clinton: “under the current mayor, crime has continued to drop, including
murders.
(53)
So there is...”
Trump: “No, you’re wrong. You’re wrong.”
Clinton: “No, I’m not.”
Trump: “Murders are up. All right. You check it.
54:30 Trump: “Look, the African-American community has been let down by our
politicians.
They talk good around election time, like right now, and after the election,
they
said, see ya later, I'll see you in four years.”
55:20 Clinton: “think Donald just criticized me for preparing for this debate. And, yes, I
did.
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And you know what else I prepared for? I prepared to be president. And I
think
that's a good thing.”
56:00 [Obama birth certificate]
(56)
58:40 Clinton: “Well, just listen to what you heard. [Trump] tried to put the whole racist
birther lie to bed … started his political activity based on this racist lie.”
60:00 Clinton: “[Trump] has a long record of engaging in racist behavior.”
… “When they go low, we go high.”
61:00 Trump: “you even sent out or your campaign sent out pictures of him in a certain
garb,
very famous pictures. I don't think you can deny that.”
63:30 Clinton: “I know Donald's very praiseworthy of Vladimir Putin”
(64)
65:00 Clinton: “I was so shocked when Donald publicly invited Putin to hack into
Americans.”
66:30 [Trump “400 pound hacker”]
“You don't know who broke in to DNC. But what did we learn with DNC? We
learned
that Bernie Sanders was taken advantage of by your people, by
Debbie Wasserman Schultz.”
71:00 Clinton: “Donald supported the invasion of Iraq.”
(71) Trump: “Wrong.”
Clinton: “That is absolutely proved over and over again.”
Trump: “Wrong. Wrong.”
76:30 [More on Trump supporting Iraq war]
[CROSSTALK] with Holt
78:18 Trump: “Well, I have much better judgment than she does. There's no question
about
(78)
that. I also have a much better temperament than she has, you know?”
Trump: “I think my strongest asset, maybe by far, is my temperament. I have a
winning
temperament. I know how to win.”
Trump: “I don't know who you were talking to, Secretary Clinton, but you were
totally
out of control. I said, there's a person with a temperament that's got a
problem.”
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79:00 Clinton: “Whew, OK.”
[Shoulder shimmy]
80:40 [Dispute over Iranian sailors taunting American sailors]
81:10 [Dispute over use of nuclear proliferation]
(81)
82:00 Clinton: “a man who can be provoked by a tweet should not have his fingers
anywhere
near the nuclear codes”
Trump: “That line’s getting a little bit old, I must say.”
84:45 Trump: “another one powerful is the worst deal I think I've ever seen negotiated
that you
started is the Iran deal.”
86:00 Clinton: “Well, let me -- let me start by saying, words matter. Words matter when
you
(86)
run for president. And they really matter when you are president.”
89:30 [“I don’t think she has the presidential look.”]
90:45 Trump: “Hillary has experience, but it's bad experience. We have made so many
bad
deals during the last -- so she's got experience, that I agree.”
91:30 Clinton: “You know, he tried to switch from looks to stamina. But this is a man
who has
(91)
called women pigs, slobs and dogs, and someone who has said pregnancy
is an
inconvenience to employers, who has said...”
Trump: “I never said that.”
Clinton: “… women don't deserve equal pay unless they do as good a job as
men.”
Trump: “I didn't say that.”
91:50 Clinton: “And one of the worst things he said was about a woman in a beauty
contest. He
loves beauty contests, supporting them and hanging around them. And he
called
this woman "Miss Piggy." Then he called her "Miss Housekeeping,"
because she
was Latina. Donald, she has a name.”
Trump: “Where did you find this? Where did you find this?”
92:15 Clinton: “Her name is Alicia Machado.”
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Trump: “Where did you find this?”
Clinton: “And she has become a U.S. citizen, and you can bet...”
Trump: “Oh, really?”
Clinton: “... she's going to vote this November.”
93:00 Trump: “I was going to say something extremely rough to Hillary, to her family,
and I
said to myself, "I can't do it. I just can't do it. It's inappropriate. It's not
nice.”
93:30 [Are you willing to accept the outcome as the will of the voters?”
Clinton: “Well, I support our democracy. And sometimes you win, sometimes you
lose.
But I certainly will support the outcome of this election.”
94:50 Trump: “The answer is, if she wins, I will absolutely support her.”
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Table 1.1: Emotion and Secondary Process Categories, Regressive Imagery Dictionary

Source: Provalis Research, https://provalisresearch.com/products/content-analysissoftware/wordstat-dictionary/regressive-imagery-dictionary/
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Graph 1.1: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Secondary
Process vs. Rates of Emotion
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Graph 1.2: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion
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Graph 1.3: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion by
Category
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Graph 1.4: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt
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Graph 1.5: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Rates of Emotion by
Category
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt
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Graph 1.6: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Average Community
Size and Modularity
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt
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Graph 1.7: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Average Path Length
and Closeness
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt
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Graph 1.8: #Debates2016 Tweets during First Presidential Debate, Relative Community
Polarization
Isolating six-minute segments of significant confrontation, controversy, and contempt
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Visualization 1.1: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Taxes & Emails”
segment
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Visualization 1.2: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Law & Order” segment
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Visualization 1.3: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Temperament” segment
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Visualization 1.4: #Debates2016 “Low Emotion” segment vs. “Words Matter” segment
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Introduction
On April 13, 2016, the Southern Poverty Law Center published a report asserting
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was “producing an alarming level of fear and
anxiety” in our nation’s schools while “inflaming racial and ethnic tensions” (Costello
2016). Labeled the “Trump Effect”, this phenomenon received significant media attention
and was cited by Hillary Clinton in her August 25, 2016, “alt-right” speech. The report
raised important questions regarding how presidential candidates’ patterns of speech may
influence feelings of resentment, fear, or incivility. However, consistent with the
Southern Poverty Law Center’s own admissions, the report lacked scientific rigor in its
methodology and reporting. Despite these flaws, the concerns voiced by the Southern
Poverty Law Center have significant societal implications, especially when placed into
the context of the United States presidency. As such, these concerns beg for scientific
research to examine the relationship between messages delivered by political elites and
the behavior of those who receive these messages.
This chapter seeks to determine the extent to which a “Trump Effect” manifests
itself in social media. First, I approach this question by examining whether a temporal
relationship exists between controversial statements made by Donald Trump during the
span of his presidential campaign and a resulting rise in affective rhetoric in the form of
aggression, anxiety, or negativity in discussion about Donald Trump on Twitter. Second,
I examine whether or not these comments influenced social networks in a way that was
more conducive to affective polarization, while also examining the extent to which these
networks facilitated potential confrontation. When combined, evidence of such
relationships would help identify the existence of a Trump Effect in social media (or,
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“Does it happen?”) while providing a measure of how deeply such an effect impacts civil
discourse (or, “Does it matter?”).
Research Design
Research Questions

Research Question #1: Do controversial comments by political elites affect
social media discourse negatively?

The first section of this chapter addresses the question: “Does it happen?”. I
explore this question by measuring whether a relationship exists between controversial
statements made by Donald Trump during the span of his presidential campaign and a
resulting rise in affective rhetoric in the form of aggression, anxiety, or negativity in
discussion about Donald Trump on Twitter. For my independent variables, I isolate
especially controversial and insensitive remarks made by Donald Trump over the span of
his primary and general election campaigns. For my dependent variable, I use levels of
aggression, anxiety, and negativity in tweets mentioning Donald Trump during this same
time span. Last, I use time series analysis to determine whether there is a relationship
between Donald Trump’s comments and a resulting rise in affective rhetoric.

Research Question #2: How do controversial comments by political elites in
online spaces shape the network architectures that facilitate these discussions?
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The second section of this chapter addresses the question: “Does it matter?”. I
explore this question by analyzing how networks of discussion behave on days where
Donald Trump made especially controversial comments. During these days, I conduct
network metrics analyses to measure the size of communities of discussion and the
relative efficiency of the networks within which these communities form. These metrics
provide evidence as to the relative levels of polarization within a given network at a
given time. If evidence of polarized communities exist, this would suggest a possible
causal link between Donald Trump’s statements and polarized environments of
discussion. Further, I seek evidence of how these networks facilitate discussion of
Donald Trump’s supporters as well as of his critics.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Controversial comments by Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S.
presidential primary and general election caused a measurable increase in rates of
anxiety, aggression, and negative affect on social media.
Hypothesis 2: Controversial comments by Donald Trump involving during the
2016 U.S. presidential primary and general election contributed to the creation of
polarized and confrontational environments on social media.
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Data and Methods
Data Collection
I test these hypotheses by using an original data set of several million tweets
mentioning Donald Trump collected daily from 9/1/2015 through 3/1/2017 using the
NodeXL template for Microsoft Excel (Social Media Research Foundation 2017).5 I use
content analysis and network metrics to measure the extent to which levels of anxiety,
aggression, and negative sentiment in tweets mentioning Donald Trump align temporally
with controversial public comments he has made during his primary and general election
campaigns.
[Insert Table 1.1]

Content Analysis
As was the case in previous chapters, the primary tool for conducting content
analysis was Lexicoder 3.0, a software application developed by Mark Daku, Stuart
Soroka, and Lori Young at McGill University. This software was used in conjunction
with the Regressive Imagery Dictionary (Martindale 1975, 1990) and the Lexicoder
Semantic Dictionary (Daku, Soroka, and Young 2016). The Regressive Imagery
Dictionary is comprised of approximately 3,000 words divided into three primary
categories with 44 sub-categories. These categories are divided into Primary Processes,
which include drive, sensation, defensive symbolization, regressive cognition, and Icarian
imagery; Secondary Processes, which include abstraction, social behavior, instrumental
behavior, restraint, order, temporal references, and moral imperative; and Emotions,
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which include positive affect, anxiety, sadness, affection, aggression, expressive
behavior, and glory. The Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary draws upon a dictionary of
approximately 5,000 words and is designed to measure the positive and negative
sentiment in political texts.6
[Insert Table 1.2]
The full text for each day of observation from 9/1/2015 to 3/1/2017 was processed
through Lexicoder 3.0 using both sentiment dictionaries, producing 548 individual data
sets containing raw counts for anxiety, aggression, and negativity. These raw counts
were then converted into rates by dividing them into the total number of words tweeted
during each day of observation. In order to make these numbers more usable, they have
been reported as “rate of anxiety per 1,000 words”, “rate of aggression per 1,000 words”,
and “rate of negativity per 1,000 words”.

Network Metrics Analysis
Several network metrics were utilized to measure for signs of relative polarization
between networks. First, I tested for average community size, as this measure provides
an indication of how densely clustered neighborhoods of discussion are in the network.
Generally speaking, networks with high average community sizes indicate a tendency of
individuals in a particular network to cluster together around certain topics, themes, or
pieces of information. Second, I tested for average path length as a percentage of
network diameter, as this measure provides evidence of a network’s efficiency and
tendency towards homophily. Generally speaking, networks featuring low relative
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average path lengths tend to be more efficient networks. As a network’s average path
length approaches its diameter, this indicates the network is becoming less efficient, as
more “steps” are required for a message to reach one end of the network to the other. For
example, if a network had a diameter of 5 and an average path length of 5, this would
mean that all messages in the network needed to pass through 5 steps in order to be
shared.7
Last, I used network visualization techniques to provide an interactive and “big
picture” view of how different messages propagate throughout different networks’ unique
architectures. This allowed for a unique look at how social networks react to extremely
controversial comments made on the part of political elites by demonstrating how certain
types of language, themes, or narratives propagated within the unique structures formed
by a social network over a discrete time frame. Most importantly, these techniques
allowed for specific messages – such as those containing hashtags supportive (or critical)
of Donald Trump – within the network to be highlighted so that their influence within the
network could be assessed spatially.

Findings
“Does it happen?”

Hypothesis 1: Controversial comments by Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S.
presidential primary and general election caused an increase in rates of anxiety,
aggression, and negative affect on social media.
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The first test of this hypothesis involved measuring how rates of anxiety,
aggression, and negative affect increased and decreased over the 548-day span of
observations. The main goal of this first test was to obtain a contextual assessment of
fluctuations in the communications environment to see if there were any identifiable
patterns in tweet content and, more importantly, to see if these patterns aligned with any
of the preselected controversial remarks.
[Insert Graph 1.1]
Upon initial analysis, it was clear that there were significant increases and
decreases in these types of language over time. It was not initially as clear whether or not
these increases and decreases aligned with specific comments made by Donald Trump.
This was likely due to the wide span of observation combined with several significant
spikes which created scaling issues that may have obscured some hidden effects. For
example, if the highest rate of anxiety measured was 14 per 1,000 words on one day, and
the rates on all remaining 547 days were below 1 per 1,000 words, rate variations within
those days would be hidden due to the predominance of a one-day spike. This is
especially important to consider, given such a spike could – and likely should – be
viewed as an outlier. As such, the time frame of observation was subdivided into fourmonth periods in order to gain a clearer focus. These subdivisions are reported in the
following four graphs:
[Insert Graph 1.2]
[Insert Graph 1.3]
[Insert Graph 1.4]
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[Insert Graph 1.5]
Despite decreasing the time frame of observation into four-month periods, there
were no clear patterns evident between any of the 20 pre-selected controversial remarks
by Donald Trump and a resulting rise in aggression, anxiety, or negativity in tweets
mentioning Donald Trump. This is not to say that increases in such language on Twitter
did not align with some of these comments by Donald Trump. Levels of aggression rose
following Donald Trump’s accusations that Hillary Clinton was playing the “woman
card”, after tweeting “I love Hispanics!”, after his reference to “Second Amendment
people” being able to do something about stopping Hillary Clinton’s election, after the
release of the “Access Hollywood” tape, and after his claim that “millions of people
voted illegally” in the election. Similarly, levels of negativity rose following Donald
Trump’s comments referencing Carly Fiorina’s face, him asking “How stupid are the
people of Iowa?”, his claim that he could “shoot someone on 5th Avenue” and not drop in
the polls, his failure to immediately disavow David Duke, his claim that “Islam hates us”,
Hillary Clinton “playing the woman card”, comments following the Pulse Nightclub
shooting in Orlando, and the release of the “Access Hollywood” tapes.
However, rates in aggression and negativity also dipped on other dates where
Donald Trump made controversial remarks. Further, there were significant spikes in
aggression and negativity on dates where Donald Trump did not make especially
controversial remarks. This suggests that while there may be a causal link between
Donald Trump and increases in aggression and negativity, such a relationship may not be
driven by his controversial remarks – at least not in social media. Thus, I did not find
compelling evidence to either fully support or reject Hypothesis #1.
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While a Trump Effect may exist, it was not readily evident using this method of
testing. However, this could have been due to a number of flaws in the research design.
For example, there may have been an error in selecting independent variables. Given that
there were spikes in affective rhetoric on certain days, this suggests that something was
causing a reaction among Twitter users as they were discussing Donald Trump. It is
possible that there were other actions, comments, or interactions by Donald Trump which
led to these reactions. Given that Donald Trump made a large number of campaign
speeches where a variety of extracurricular events occurred, it is possible that one of
these events could have elicited negative reactions among Twitter users.
Further, it is possible that there were better choices for measuring the dependent
variable. While rates of aggression, anxiety, and negativity seem to fit the Southern
Poverty Law Center’s notion of a Trump Effect, there could be other ways of performing
content analysis that would be more effective in drawing such sentiments out of Tweets.
For example, aggression, anxiety, and negativity do not necessarily equate to indicators
of “bullying” behavior. In sum, it is entirely possible that a more applicable and relevant
content dictionary would lead to different results in the content analysis.

“Does it matter?”

Hypothesis 2: Controversial comments by Donald Trump involving during the
2016 U.S. presidential primary and general election contributed to the creation of
polarized and confrontational environments on social media.
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The time series analysis did not provide much evidence to support a Trump Effect
on social media as defined by a temporal relationship between controversial comments
and forms of mass affective rhetoric. As previously noted, the content analysis portion of
this study could very easily have used the wrong words for analysis and, in turn, may
have missed evidence of a Trump Effect. However, it is still possible that elite cues in
the form of controversial comments have a polarizing effect on the networks in which
discussion occurs. Further, it is possible that the creation of such networks could
facilitate confrontation more effectively than others. If so, evidence of a type of Trump
Effect may still exist. For the second section of this analysis, I used network analysis
metrics to gain a better understanding regarding the nature and structure of the discrete
networks that form in response to controversial comments made by political elites and,
more importantly, facilitate potentially deleterious sentiment in individuals’ responses.
Additionally, I used hashtag analysis and network visualizations to examine the extent to
which competing narratives clash in the wake of Donald Trump’s most controversial
comments.

Network Analysis
[Insert Table 1.3]
Just as it was necessary to limit the number of Donald Trump’s controversial
statements for use in the time series analysis, it was also necessary to limit these
statements even further in order to conduct a focused set of network analyses. As such, I
narrowed these statements down to six instances where Donald Trump’s controversial
comments dealt with issues of gender, religion, race, and disabilities. I selected Hillary
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Clinton’s “alt-right speech” (8/25/2016) as a control measure to measure whether or not
networks developed differently when Donald Trump made these controversial comments
compared to when he was being attacked or criticized for making these comments.
Unfortunately, I experienced corruption in my data set for the day when the
Access Hollywood tape was released (12/7/2016). As of the time of this writing, I was
not yet able to repair the corrupted data so it was not able to be included in this study.
Future research will include this data, as this comment created a major firestorm which
nearly derailed Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and led to widespread protests
following his election.
[Insert Graph 2.1]
The first network test was designed to identify whether networks on certain days
were more likely to facilitate confrontation than networks on other days. This test used
average path length as a proportion of network diameter as a measure of homophily, as
this can be an indicator of polarized communities. Such a measure is important, as
discussion within polarized communities tends to be more homogenous in nature and, in
turn, less confrontational. This test also used average community size as a measure of
cluster intensity. Generally speaking, networks with higher average community sizes
tend to have a larger number of people discussing similar issues or interests. Whereas
average path length as a proportion of network diameter suggests polarized communities,
average community size suggests the intensity of this polarization.
It should be stressed that these measures are relative to each other and lose their
descriptive power if read as absolute independent values. Network analysis is often a
process of comparison, where conclusions regarding the nature of one network gain
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strength based upon the ability to compare that network’s characteristics with another
network’s characteristics. Using such a comparative approach when analyzing this first
network test, a network with a comparatively high average path and average community
size is more likely to facilitate highly populated polarized communities than a network
with a comparatively low average path and average community size. Likewise, a
network with a comparatively low average path and high community size is more likely
to facilitate highly populated connected communities, while a network with a
comparatively high average path and low community size is more likely to facilitate
diffuse and more sparsely inhabited communities.
This initial network analysis found that the control network on the day of Hillary
Clinton’s “alt right speech” was the most connected (or least polarized) network
containing the second highest population density per community. These results suggest
that a comparatively high amount of discussion between communities was occurring
during Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”, and that these individual communities were
more highly populated.
The network on the day of Donald Trump’s “millions of people voted illegally”
comment was the second most connected (or least polarized) network containing the
highest population density per community. However, this network’s level of polarization
was significantly higher than the network on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right
speech”, placing it in the middle of the polarization pack with networks on the days of
Donald Trump’s comments about a disabled reporter, his accusation that Hillary Clinton
was playing the “woman card”, and his proposal for a temporary ban on Muslims. These
latter three networks also ranked comparatively lower in average community size which,
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in turn, suggested lower community population density. Last, networks that formed in
the wake of Donald Trump’s comments stating “Islam hates us” and “I love Hispanics!”
easily ranked as the most polarized networks with the 2nd and 3rd lowest community
population densities; communities of discussion in these networks were far less
concentrated and far less connected than the networks that formed on other days.
When analyzing these results within the context of the existence of a Trump
Effect, questions arise as to whether network polarization can be a “good” thing as well
as a “bad” thing. For example, if the predominant language in a given network is
inflammatory, aggressive, intemperate, or counterproductive to civil discourse, one could
argue that network polarization would be a “good” thing; polarized networks are less
connected and less efficient, thus moderating the effect of deleterious discourse.
Conversely, tightly-knit (or less polarized) networks could be argued to be a “bad” thing,
given the same conditions.
Answering such questions requires an understanding that measures of network
polarization only indicate the structure of the networks facilitating discussion. They take
on new meaning when we take into account the nature of the discussion occurring within
these networks. Content analysis performed while testing the first hypothesis found that
rates of aggression in tweets (11.11 per 1,000 words) mentioning Donald Trump reached
their highest point (out of 548 days) on the day which he claimed “millions voted
illegally” in the election. The second highest rate of aggression (10.92 per 1,000 words)
was measured the day after these comments.
Putting these rates in perspective, this meant that more than 1% of all words in
tweets mentioning Donald Trump on these days could be categorized as aggressive.
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These two rates were significantly higher than the 3rd highest rate of aggression (7.94 per
1,000 words) and far higher than the average rate for all 548 days of observation (0.66
per 1,000 words). Given that the network on this date was relatively connected and
populated by communities with relatively high population densities, it could be
concluded that a lack of network polarization was somewhat of a “bad” thing. The
network was facilitating efficient communication between large communities and the
discussion was notably aggressive. Further, it provides compelling evidence that a form
of a Trump Effect could, in fact, exist when observed in a network analysis frame of
reference.
Interestingly, the content analysis performed while testing the first hypothesis
found that rates of negativity (5.44) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump reached their 8th
highest value (out of 548 days) on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt-right speech”. This
rate was roughly twice as high as the average rate of negativity (2.64) for the entire 548
days of observation. As was the case with the network on the day of Donald Trump’s
“millions voted illegally” comment, it could be concluded that a lack of network
polarization was a “bad” thing, in that the network was efficient in facilitating negativity
between large communities.
The battery of network analyses strongly suggest that Donald Trump’s “millions
voted illegally” comment created a network structure that efficiently spread aggression,
while Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” created a network that efficiently spread
negativity. These results provide evidence of structural network preconditions for a type
of Trump Effect to exist.
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Hashtag Analysis and Network Visualizations
Given that evidence was found of networks that were capable of efficiently
facilitating aggression and negativity, a final set of tests were conducted to approximate
the individuals to whom these sentiments were directed. Rather put, in order to
determine the extent to which a Trump Effect exists, it was necessary to determine at
whom this aggression and negativity was being directed. To this end, I performed a
hashtag analysis on tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the day of his “millions of
immigrants voted illegally” comment and on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right
speech”.
[Insert Graph 2.2]
[Insert Graph 2.3]
[Insert Table 1.4]
The hashtag analysis for the network of tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the
day he claimed “millions voted illegally” contained several hashtags that could be
categorized as “pro Trump” and several that could be categorized as “anti Trump”. The
“pro Trump” hashtags were identified as #maga (115), #gop (41), and #tcot (34). While
it is true that there was significant resistance to Donald Trump amongst Republicans
(#gop) and conservatives (#tcot, or “true conservatives on Twitter), given the context of
the date for this network, I assumed that neither Republicans nor conservatives would
more likely to support Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in a dispute over the results of
the presidential election. The “anti Trump” hashtags were identified as #recount2016
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(85), #auditthevote (81), #amjoy (77), #recount16 (52), #notmypresident (43),
#votersuppression (32), #imstillwithher (28), and #resisttrump (22).
In the aggregate, “anti Trump” hashtags (420) far outnumbered “pro Trump”
hashtags (190). Further, this network featured by far the highest rate of aggression (11.11
per 1,000 words) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump out of the 548 days of observation.
Donald Trump’s claim that “millions voted illegally” in the election produced a great
deal of aggression and, most importantly, this aggression was expressed in opposition to
Donald Trump, rather than in support of Donald Trump. This suggests that if a Trump
Effect exists in social media, it does not exist in a form where it is aggression directed
towards those who oppose Donald Trump, but rather it is aggression directed towards
Donald Trump. However, aggression in the aggregate does not necessarily mean this
aggression was influential. In order to determine the extent to which aggression
contributed to a confrontational environment, I employed a second test using network
visualizations.
[Insert Graph 2.4]
[Insert Graph 2.5]
[Insert Graph 2.6]
For these visualizations, tweets with “pro Trump” hashtags were highlighted in
red, while “anti Trump” hashtags were highlighted in blue. As these visualizations
demonstrate, “anti Trump” hashtags were much more successful at engaging the center of
discussion far more frequently than “pro Trump” hashtags and, as such, were more
influential. In sum, “anti Trump” sentiment was more frequent, more aggressive, and
more influential than “pro Trump” sentiment on the day Donald Trump alleged that
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“millions voted illegally” in the election. Rather than resulting in a Trump Effect where
Donald Trump’s controversial comments fostered aggression among his supporters, it
appears that these comments fostered aggression in his opponents.
[Insert Graph 2.7]
[Insert Graph 2.8]
[Insert Table 1.5]
An identical pair of network tests were performed on the “control” network
containing tweets mentioning Donald Trump on the day of Hillary Clinton’s “alt right
speech”. The “pro Trump” hashtags on this day were identified as #trump2016 (15),
#makeamericagreatagain (14), #maga (13), #latinosfortrump (8), #trumptrain (8),
#leadright (6), #tcot (6), #sickhillary (5), and #trumppence16 (5). The “anti Trump”
hashtags were identified as #imwithher (31), #nevertrump (24), #toxictrump (21),
#uniteblue (8), and #voteblue (6).
In the aggregate, “anti Trump” hashtags (90) slightly outnumbered “pro Trump”
hashtags (75). This network featured the 8th highest rate of negativity (5.44 per 1,000
words) in tweets mentioning Donald Trump out of 548 days of observation. Just as
Donald Trump’s claim that “millions voted illegally” in the election produced a great
deal of aggression, Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech” produced a significant amount of
negativity. This negativity occurred in an atmosphere that was only slightly (20%) more
“anti Trump” than “pro Trump”, rather than being decidedly more “anti Trump” as was
the case following Donald Trump’s “millions voted illegally” comment. However,
negativity in the aggregate does not necessarily mean such sentiment was influential. In
order to determine the extent to which negativity contributed to a confrontational
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environment, I employed an identical set of network visualizations to those performed on
the network following Donald Trump’s “millions voted illegally” comment.
[Insert Graph 2.9]
[Insert Graph 2.10]
[Insert Graph 2.11]
For these visualizations, tweets with “pro Trump” hashtags were highlighted in
red, while “anti Trump” hashtags were highlighted in blue. These visualizations indicate
that “anti Trump” hashtags were much more successful at engaging the center of
discussion far more frequently than “pro Trump” hashtags and, as such, were more
influential. As was the case with the “millions voted illegally” network, “anti Trump”
sentiment in the “alt right speech” network was more frequent, more negative, and more
influential than “pro Trump” sentiment. Rather than resulting in a Trump Effect where
Donald Trump’s controversial comments fostered negativity among his supporters, it
appears that these comments fostered negativity in his opponents.

Conclusions and Discussion
In sum, this chapter did not find compelling evidence to support the existence of a
Trump Effect in social media. After using time series analysis spanning 548 individual
days of observation, the findings suggested controversial comments made by Donald
Trump during this time frame did not align temporally with increases in aggression,
anxiety, or negativity in the resulting Twitter discussion about Donald Trump. When
applying a network analysis approach, evidence was found of a phenomenon similar to
the alleged Trump Effect; however, this evidence seemed to point more to a
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“Clinton/Trump Effect”. Rather put, the network analysis suggested that controversial
comments and expressions of elite polarization do have the effect of inciting aggression
and negativity in the general public. As such, the findings provide compelling evidence
of a causal link between elite polarization and mass affective polarization, which should
provide for ample opportunities for future research.
Questions surrounding the existence of a “Trump Effect” are, at the very least,
based in noble intentions and grounded in the goals of reducing incivility, anger, and
resentment towards others that can lead to very negative real world consequences. For
example, we know that the problem of bullying in schools is a serious issue that often
leads to a type of destruction to the innocence of youth which can have deep impacts on a
child’s development, both immediately as well as into the future. There is also evidence
that adults are influenced by inflammatory rhetoric designed to target the lesser
advantaged or the more vulnerable amongst us. If it is true that our leaders are engaging
in actions that lead to an increase in such predatory behavior, then it is incumbent upon
our civil society to identify, condemn, and seek corrections to such actions.
At the same time, care must be taken to confirm such a causal relationship exists
before even the first moral sanction begins. The “Trump Effect” first gained notoriety
following a survey conducted by an organization who openly admitted to its lack of
scientific rigor. This does not negate the good intentions of such an effort, nor does it
diminish the need to question whether such an effect exists. It does, however, highlight
the need to maintain a pragmatic and scientific mindset when investigating questions with
such important implications. This is especially true considering discussions about and
references to the “Trump Effect” often blurred the line between moral imperative and a
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strategic political tool. Maintaining a pragmatic and scientific mindset can indeed be a
challenge when one attempts to maintain objective neutrality while analyzing aspects of
one of the most contentious and nasty presidential elections in modern history.
Regardless, this research has been conducted in manner that placed such an approach as
the highest priority.
The goal of this chapter has been to test for a Trump Effect in a small slice of
American society: discussions about Donald Trump on Twitter. It should be stressed that
this slice of American society was not representative of the broader American citizenry,
nor were the behaviors engaged in this environment representative of the wide range of
behaviors human beings in which human beings are capable of engaging. Further, this
research applied a unique mixed methods approach using empirical tests that may benefit
from further methodological refinement.
The findings presented in this chapter also raised the possibility that forms of
mass polarization – whether ideological or affective in nature – may not always
necessarily be a “bad” thing. For example, in networks where there are high levels of
aggression or negativity, perhaps it is more desirable for these discussions to be confined
within clusters of likeminded individuals. In such a scenario, the likelihood of open and
aggressive confrontation with others is less likely, leaving misery to enjoy company.
Such questions beg for additional research into some of the potential network effects
highlighted in this chapter.
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Table 1.1: Selections from Donald Trump’s Most Controversial Statements as
Presidential Candidate and President Elect
Date
9/9/15
11/12/15
11/24/15
12/7/15
1/23/16
2/6/16
2/28/16
3/3/16
3/9/16
4/28/16
5/3/16
5/5/16
6/12/16
7/2/16
7/21/16
7/29/16
8/9/16
8/19/16
8/25/16
10/7/16
11/28/16

Comment
Rolling Stone interview, Carly Fiorina’s face
“How stupid are the people of Iowa?”
Disabled Reporter
Temporary Muslim Immigration Ban
“I could shoot someone on 5th Avenue”
Bring back things a “hell of a lot worse” than waterboarding
David Duke
Size of his “something else” (Rubio and hands spat)
“I think Islam hates us.”
Clinton playing the “woman card”
Ted Cruz’s Dad and JFK Assassination
“I love Hispanics!”
“appreciate the congrats for being right on radical Islamic
terrorism”
The “star” tweet
RNC Speech
Khan
“Second Amendment people”
to black voters: “What do you have to lose?”
Hillary's "alt-right" speech
Access Hollywood tape
Millions of people voted illegally
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Table 1.2: Emotion and Secondary Process Categories, Regressive Imagery Dictionary

Source: Provalis Research, https://provalisresearch.com/products/content-analysissoftware/wordstat-dictionary/regressive-imagery-dictionary/
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Graph 1.1: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump
9/1/2015 – 3/1/2017
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Graph 1.2: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump
9/1/2015 – 12/31/2015
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Graph 1.3: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump
1/1/2016 – 4/30/2016
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Graph 1.4: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump
5/1/2016 – 8/31/2016
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Graph 1.5: Aggression, Anxiety, and Negativity in Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump
9/1/2016 – 12/31/2016
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Table 1.3: Donald Trump’s Controversial Statements as Presidential Candidate and
President Elect - Issues of gender, religion, race, and disabilities
11/24/15
12/7/15
3/9/16
4/28/16
5/5/16
8/25/16
11/28/16

Disabled Reporter
Temporary Muslim Immigration Ban
“I think Islam hates us.”
Clinton playing the “woman card”
“I love Hispanics!”
Hillary's "alt-right" speech (control measure)
Millions of people voted illegally
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Graph 2.1: Controversial Statements by Donald Trump involving Race, Gender,
Religion, and Disabilities – Network Efficiency and Intensity
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Graph 2.2: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 –
“Millions of people voted illegally”

Source: Twitter (11/28/2016)
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Graph 2.3: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016 –
“Millions of people voted illegally”

Source: Twitter (11/28/2016)
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Table 1.4: “Pro Trump” and “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Tweets Mentioning Donald
Trump on 11/28/2016 – “Millions of people voted illegally”
"Pro Trump"
#maga
#gop
#tcot

"Anti Trump"
#recount2016
#auditthevote
#recount16
#amjoy
#notmypresident
#votersuppression
#imstillwithher
#resisttrump

174
Graph 2.4: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016
–
“Millions of people voted illegally”

Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq
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Graph 2.5: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016
–
“Millions of people voted illegally”

Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq
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Graph 2.6: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 11/28/2016
–
“Millions of people voted illegally”

Source: Twitter (11/28/2016) and Gephi 0.8.1
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2ppC4Hq
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Graph 2.7: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 –
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”

Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
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Graph 2.8: Hashtag Analysis of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 –
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”

Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)

179
Table 1.5: “Pro Trump” and “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Tweets Mentioning Donald
Trump on 8/25/2016 – Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”
"Pro Trump"
#trump2016
#makeamericagreatagain
#maga
#latinosfortrump
#trumptrain
#leadright
#tcot
#sickhillary
#trumppence16

"Anti Trump"
#imwithher
#nevertrump
#toxictrump
#uniteblue
#voteblue
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Graph 2.9: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016 –
Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”

Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I
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Graph 2.10: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016
– Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”

Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I
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Graph 2.11: Network Visualization of Tweets Mentioning Donald Trump on 8/25/2016
– Hillary Clinton’s “alt right speech”

Source: Twitter (8/25/2016)
Note: “Pro Trump” Hashtags in Blue, “Anti Trump” Hashtags in Red
Note: Supplemental short 3d video fly-through of network at: http://bit.ly/2o3xD4I
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At the dawn of the Information Age in the early 1990’s, the Internet was viewed
in largely utopian frames as a powerful new tool that would allow people to share and
connect with each other in ways previously unimaginable. This utopian perspective
extended into the world of politics, where many believed the low cost and easy
accessibility of the Internet would encourage people to engage in the democratic process
more frequently. Given the availability of such a powerful tool, it was also assumed that
citizens worldwide would seize upon the opportunity to organize collectively to promote
causes important to them, while also organizing dissent in order to hold their leaders
responsible.
Perhaps the most visible example of such organized engagement by citizens was
seen in the “Arab Spring” protests that spread throughout the Middle East and Northern
Africa from late 2010 through early 2011. It is difficult to deny the extent to which the
Internet – and especially social media – provided citizens with the tools to organize
massive protests that would likely have not been achievable otherwise. The end results
were visibly striking, with images of massive public protests in multiple town squares
across several middle-eastern nations being broadcast around the clock on television sets
and computer screens around the world. To many, the ability for massive public
demonstrations to rise from the grass-roots and demand democratization in the face of
oppressive regimes was proof positive of the positive nature of social media.
At the same time, the Arab Spring also had a far less publicized downside. Just as
social media equipped citizens with the power to organize coordinated opposition to
ostensibly unjust regimes, social media also equipped these regimes with the power to
identify, isolate, and retaliate against the political threats. The Arab Spring provides a
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powerful example of the dual nature of social media and how it can be used as a strategic
tool for achieving political goals, whether those goals are perceived to be good or bad for
democratic ideals such as egalitarianism or the right to free political speech.
The dual nature of social media matters within the scope of democratic
participation because it frames our understanding of affective rhetoric and the
relationship between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media. Social
media can be used to organize public dissent or to share information regarding important
policies, just as it can be used to target political threats or to spread false and misleading
information. Likewise, social media can be used as a vehicle for citizens to engage in
rational and reasoned debate, just as it can be used to spread hatred, fear, anger, and
aggression. One could argue social media is a reflection of human nature. However,
rather than merely reflecting human nature, in many ways social media magnifies it.
Such power is critical when considering the impact of social media on the democratic
process, as this is a process that depends upon healthy participation.
It is broadly accepted that polarization amongst the political elites in the United
States is extremely pronounced. The extent to which this has manifested itself in the
form of mass polarization is less clear. In part, this clarity has been elusive due to
various possible causes of mass polarization, whether they be due to political elite cues,
sorting, psychological impulses, or something else. Regardless, mass polarization can be
used by politicians in order to mobilize support and to win elections. Unfortunately,
when it is time for those politicians to transition into elected officials, the politics of fear
and loathing become incompatible in an environment that requires negotiation and
compromise (Kimball et al. 2013).
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As social media continues to evolve as a platform for individuals to gather,
process, share, and debate political issues, its potential for affecting mass polarization
also grows. Measuring how the frequency of potentially polarizing language on social
media changes over time with relation to the occurrence of a political event is an
important step in better understanding how elite cues influence mass polarization in
different information environments. More importantly, measuring how social networks
treat polarizing language provides valuable insight into whether increases in such
language will have a net negative effect on constructive debate, or whether it will be
pushed to the fringes where its audience will be smaller and less influential.

Future Research
This dissertation presents a number of opportunities for future research, both on
the front end with data collection as well as the back end with hypothesis testing. First,
future research could employ notable improvements in the data collection process. As
noted in previous chapters, data for this dissertation was gathered using outdated
computers and an almost-free alternative for gathering daily random samples of Twitter
data within the last seven days. With more robust funding, higher quality data could be
obtained directly from the historical Twitter archives. Such an option would allow
researchers to search for specific terms within a clearly defined set of parameters,
including specific time and date ranges, tweet volume per day, and so on. In turn, this
would lead to more consistent data sets for use in time-series analysis, rather than
requiring research to be conducted on data sets consisting of random samples varying
from 1,000 to 30,000 tweets per day. Further, more robust funding would allow for
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several more powerful computers, thus allowing researchers to conduct live-streaming of
Twitter messages as they occur. Such data collection methods were tested during the
writing of this dissertation and provided rich and descriptive data sets that would be
invaluable to creating more complete data sets for future research.
Second, future research could build upon this dissertation by improving upon the
classification of data, specifically in the area of content analysis. While unsupervised
content analysis provides a powerful tool for making sense of incredibly large amounts of
data, it has some shortcomings in that it is dependent upon the quality of the content
classification dictionary. The first content classification dictionary used in this
dissertation was the Lexicoder Semantic Dictionary, which is widely considered to be an
accurate and dependable tool for measuring sentiment in political texts. The second
classification dictionary (the Regressive Imagery Dictionary) used in this dissertation was
not quite as well-known or well-used in the social sciences, although it was valuable in
identifying specific types of affect in messages, such as anger, aggression, and fear.
However, a modified version of this dictionary specially tailored for analyzing political
texts would likely provide more accurate results. Further, future research could better
define extremely uncivil language. This dissertation selected the “F Word” as an
example of extremely uncivil language, although this word can sometimes be used to
express joy, excitement, anger, fear, or many other emotions. Additionally, there are
other extremely uncivil words that were not measured in this dissertation. Again, this
provides a number of opportunities for future researchers to create and refine an original
content classification dictionary.
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Third, future research could build upon the explanatory power of the methodology
employed in this dissertation by better identifying exactly what is happening inside the
communities of discussion identified through network analysis. While the methods used
in this dissertation identified areas where polarization was more likely, more could be
done with respect to determining whether or not the polarization was involving mostly
positive or mostly negative types of discussion. Further, more could be done in the area
of identifying basic characteristics of the users involved in these discussions. For
example, future research could be conducted on measuring Twitter account data such as
the account age, number of followers, number of people followed, whether or not the
account has a profile picture, the types of websites the account tends to share, the users
the account follows, and so on. Such information would be invaluable for better
describing the ideological leanings of users in the network, while also providing evidence
of whether the user was a real person versus a bot.
Last, the findings in this dissertation could be refined by future research into what
their implications are in the real world, by questioning what happens outside of Twitter
when people put down their phones or walk away from computers and decide to either
participate politically – or not. One way of potentially providing such answers could
involve the use of a second wave survey of members of the networks, using a traditional
question-and-answer format. An immediate benefit of a second wave survey would be
that it would instantly filter out bots. A more valuable benefit would be that it would
provide researchers with a clearer picture of how behavior in social networks (and,
possibly, polarized social networks) translates into political participation. Additionally,
such data would be quite useful in describing differences in Twitter users when compared
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to the broader population. Perhaps most importantly, a second wave survey would allow
the more novel approach of network analysis to be supplemented by more traditional (and
better known) methodologies like regression analysis.

Implications
A sense of urgency is needed in developing a better understanding of human
behavior in networked environments. This urgency is warranted given the rapid pace at
which everyday objects are being merged into networked environments. Commonly
referred to as the “Internet of Things”, this phenomenon raises a host of important
questions with significant political implications regarding privacy, individual freedoms,
and the proper role of government – not to mention the deeper philosophical questions
regarding the ideal relationship between humans and technology.
While estimates vary, the size of the Internet of Things is expected to grow from
approximately 6 billion devices in 2016 to as many as 50 billion devices in 2020.
Understandably, the worlds of technology and business are hard at work to ensure the
Internet of Things is implemented in a manner that is timely, efficient, and profitable. At
the same time, it is essential for social scientists to keep pace with these rapid
developments, especially with respect to how the Internet of Things will undoubtedly
impact the relationship between citizens, business, and government. These areas have
serious normative implications in a democratic republic with citizens who expect
openness, transparency, and responsiveness in their institutions, while simultaneously
valuing freedom, privacy, and the power of participation. Further, such rapid changes in
humans’ relationships with technology begs new questions with respect to government’s
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role in stimulating, moderating, and regulating these relationships in order to foster a
civic culture that encourages participation, promotes responsible citizenship, and protects
individuals’ privacy rights.

Conclusions
Does elite polarization contribute to mass polarization in social media? This
dissertation has presented strong evidence of a causal relationship between the two. First,
there is a positive relationship between the temporal proximity to certain types of
political events and a corresponding rise in affective rhetoric in social media, as well as a
corresponding rise in certain types of extremely uncivil language. This evidence was
presented within the scope of the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary, and suggests
that elite polarization expressed through affective rhetoric and other cues can elicit
similar rises in affect among the mass public. However, despite rises in affective rhetoric
in the aggregate, social media networks exhibit the ability to isolate extremely
unproductive language, thus limiting its reach and impact.
Second, there is positive relationship between specific types of emotional
responses in the mass public when exposed to elite affective rhetoric. This evidence was
presented within the scope of a live broadcast of the first 2016 Presidential debate
between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, and suggests that the types of emotional
responses in the mass public (such as anger, aggression, or fear) are dependent upon the
context of the elite cue (such as controversy, contempt, or confrontation). This evidence
is especially useful because it was obtained in a manner designed to capture the instant
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effects of elite polarization on the mass public, thus providing a glimpse into people’s
base reactions before they have had time to digest, contemplate, and reflect.
Third, this dissertation used an objective and scientific approach to test for the
existence of a so-called “Trump Effect” in social media, as initially defined by an
unscientific report by the Southern Poverty Law Center. This purported phenomenon
was widely reported in the media and on the presidential campaign trail as having
contributed to a rise in aggression towards women, people with disabilities, and people in
the racial, ethnic, and religious minority. However, little evidence was found to support
the claim that controversial comments made by Donald Trump during the primary and
general election led to a corresponding rise in anger, aggression, fear, or anxiety in social
media. Interestingly, the most observable rises in such emotions corresponded with
Hillary Clinton’s “Alt-Right” speech, which consisted primarily of strong criticisms
towards Donald Trump and a segment of his supporters. Not only did these findings shed
doubt on the existence of a “Trump Effect” in social media, but they provided additional
strong evidence of a link between elite polarization and mass polarization in social media.
Specifically, high frequencies of affective rhetoric in Hillary Clinton’s “Alt Right”
speech corresponded with notable increases in affective rhetoric on social media, thus
creating an atmosphere more conducive to the growth of mass polarization.
One central argument forwarded in this dissertation has been that the relationship
between elite and mass polarization in social media cannot be measured effectively or
accurately using the same set of tools that are used within traditional media. Because of
the significant differences between the traditional and social media environments, the
nature of elite influence must be defined contextually when considering its power in

192
social media. Simply put, elite cues are processed differently in social media than they
are in traditional media sources. Some expressions of affective rhetoric can be
transmitted, processed, and disseminated within social media in a manner that has a far
greater impact than it would have had through traditional sources. Similarly, other
expressions of affective rhetoric can be sequestered by social media networks through
self-policing behavior that shuns extremely uncivil messages, thus blunting the reach and
impact of otherwise high-volume messages.
Rather, such questions must be answered in a way that accounts for the unique
context of the media, lending credence to Marshall McLuhan’s 1964 observation that
“the medium is the message”. If it is true that the characteristics of the medium are just
as important as the content delivered over the medium, one must take into account that
the nature of the social media communications environment is structurally different than
the traditional media environment. In this respect, social media plays a part in modifying
the relationship between political elites and the mass public, at the very least.
Spiro Agnew once lamented that the state of media was being pervaded by
“nattering nabobs of negativity”. Saffire-crafted clever alliterations aside, there was
wisdom in this warning. Political elites – whether they are elected officials or members
of the media – hold significant power when it comes to influencing mass beliefs.
Affective rhetoric – whether it is positive or negative in nature – has an impact on
shaping political discourse in the mass public. Most importantly, the medium matters
when seeking to determine the reach and impact of these cues. Social scientists must use
a set of tools appropriate to the type of communications medium being observed.
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This dissertation has sought to measure the extent to which elite polarization
influences mass polarization in social media by employing a unique mixed methods set of
tools. In doing so, the research presented herein has contributed to the political science
literature by revealing a relationship between elite and mass polarization that would not
have been observable using the traditional tools of social science. However, the
immediate utility of these findings does not represent this dissertation’s full contribution
to political science. Rather, the most durable contribution may be defined by the novel
methodological approaches employed while addressing the main research question, as
they provide a flexible blueprint for future researchers who seek to better understand how
networked technologies shape human interactions.
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